Archive for the ‘network thinking’ Category

Revisiting the “Glocal” integration of universals and historical context

April 11, 2014

Integrated considerations of the universal and the local, the pure ideal parameters and the messy concrete observations, seem ever more ubiquitous in my reading lately. For instance, Ricoeur (1992, p. 289) takes up the problem of human rights imperfectly realized as a product of Western Europe’s cultural history that has nonetheless been adopted by nearly every country in the world. Ricoeur raises the notion of “universals in context or of potential or inchoate universals” that embody the paradox in which

“on the one hand, one must maintain the universal claim attached to a few values where the universal and the historical intersect, and on the other hand, one must submit this claim to discussion, not on a formal level, but on the level of the convictions incorporated in concrete forms of life.”

I could hardly come up with a better description of Rasch measurement theory and practice myself. Any given Rasch model data analysis provides many times more individual-level qualitative statistics on the concrete, substantive observations than on the global quantitative measures. The whole point of graphical displays of measurement information in kidmaps (Chien, Wang, Wang, & Lin, 2009; Masters, 1994), Wright maps (Wilson, 2011), construct maps and self-scoring forms (Best, 2008; Linacre, 1997), etc. is precisely to integrate concrete events as they happened with the abstract ideal of a shared measurement dimension.

It is such a shame that there are so few people thinking about these issues aware of the practical value of the state of the art in measurement, and who include all of the various implications of multifaceted, multilevel, and multi-uni-dimensional modeling, fit assessment, equating, construct mapping, standard setting, etc. in their critiques.

The problem falls squarely in the domain of recent work on the coproduction of social, scientific, and economic orders (such as Hutchins 2010, 2012; Nersessian, 2012). Systems of standards, from languages to metric units to dollars, prethink the world for us and simplify a lot of complex work. But then we’re stuck at the level of conceptual, social, economic, and scientific complexity implied by those standards, unless we can create new forms of social organization integrating more domains. Those who don’t know anything about the available tools can’t get any analytic traction, those who know about the tools but don’t connect with the practitioners can’t get any applied traction (see Wilson’s Psychometric Society Presidential Address on this; Wilson, 2013), analysts and practitioners who form alliances but fail to include accountants or administrators may lack financial or organizational traction, etc. etc.

There’s a real need to focus on the formation of alliances across domains of practice, building out the implications of Callon’s (1995, p. 58) observation that “”translation networks weave a socionature.” In other words, standards are translated into the languages of different levels and kinds of practice to the extent that people become so thoroughly habituated to them that they succumb to the illusion that the objects of interest are inherently natural in self-evident ways. (My 2014 IOMW talk took this up, though there wasn’t a lot of time for details.)

Those who are studying these networks have come to important insights that set the stage for better measurement and metrology for human, social, and natural capital. For instance, in a study of universalities in medicine, Berg and Timmermans (2000, pp. 55, 56) note:

“In order for a statistical logistics to enhance precise decision making, it has to incorporate imprecision; in order to be universal, it has to carefully select its locales. The parasite cannot be killed off slowly by gradually increasing the scope of the Order. Rather, an Order can thrive only when it nourishes its parasite—so that it can be nourished by it.”

“Paradoxically, then, the increased stability and reach of this network was not due to more (precise) instructions: the protocol’s logistics could thrive only by parasitically drawing upon its own disorder.”

Though Berg and Timmermans show no awareness at all of probabilistic and additive conjoint measurement theory and practice, their description of how a statistical logistics has to work to enhance precise decision making is right on target. This phenomenon of noise-induced order is a kind of social stochastic resonance (Fisher, 1992, 2011b) that provides another direction in which explanations of Rasch measurement’s potential role in establishing new metrological standards (Fisher, 2009, 2011a) have to be taken.

Berg, M., & Timmermans, S. (2000). Order and their others: On the constitution of universalities in medical work. Configurations, 8(1), 31-61.

Best, W. R. (2008). A construct map that Ben Wright would relish. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 22(3), 1169-70 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt223a.htm].

Callon, M. (1995). Four models for the dynamics of science. In S. Jasanoff, G. E. Markle, J. C. Petersen & T. Pinch (Eds.), Handbook of science and technology studies (pp. 29-63). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Chien, T.-W., Wang, W.-C., Wang, H.-Y., & Lin, H.-J. (2009). Online assessment of patients’ views on hospital performances using Rasch model’s KIDMAP diagram. BMC Health Services Research, 9, 135 [10.1186/1472-6963-9-135 or http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2727503/%5D.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (1992, Spring). Stochastic resonance and Rasch measurement. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 5(4), 186-187 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt54k.htm].

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2009, November). Invariance and traceability for measures of human, social, and natural capital: Theory and application. Measurement, 42(9), 1278-1287.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2011a). Bringing human, social, and natural capital to life: Practical consequences and opportunities. In N. Brown, B. Duckor, K. Draney & M. Wilson (Eds.), Advances in Rasch Measurement, Vol. 2 (pp. 1-27). Maple Grove, MN: JAM Press.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2011b). Stochastic and historical resonances of the unit in physics and psychometrics. Measurement: Interdisciplinary Research & Perspectives, 9, 46-50.

Hutchins, E. (2010). Cognitive ecology. Topics in Cognitive Science, 2, 705-715.

Hutchins, E. (2012). Concepts in practice as sources of order. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 19, 314-323.

Linacre, J. M. (1997). Instantaneous measurement and diagnosis. Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation State of the Art Reviews, 11(2), 315-324 [http://www.rasch.org/memo60.htm].

Masters, G. N. (1994). KIDMAP – a history. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 8(2), 366 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt82k.htm].

Nersessian, N. J. (2012). Engineering concepts: The interplay between concept formation and modeling practices in bioengineering sciences. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 19, 222-239.

Wilson, M. R. (2011). Some notes on the term: “Wright Map.” Rasch Measurement Transactions, 25(3), 1331 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt253.pdf].

Wilson, M. (2013, April). Seeking a balance between the statistical and scientific elements in psychometrics. Psychometrika, 78(2), 211-236.

Advertisements

Convergence, Divergence, and the Continuum of Field-Organizing Activities

March 29, 2014

So what are the possibilities for growing out green shoots from the seeds and roots of an ethical orientation to keeping the dialogue going? What kinds of fruits might be expected from cultivating a common ground for choosing discourse over violence? What are the consequences for practice of planting this seed in this ground?

The same participant in the conversation earlier this week at Convergence XV who spoke of the peace building processes taking place around the world also described a developmental context for these issues of mutual understanding. The work of Theo Dawson and her colleagues (Dawson, 2002a, 2002b, 2004; Dawson, Fischer, and Stein, 2006) is especially pertinent here. Their comparisons of multiple approaches to cognitive and moral development have provided clear and decisive theory, evidence, and instrumentation concerning the conceptual integrations that take place in the evolution of hierarchical complexity.

Conceptual integrations occur when previously tacit, unexamined, and assumed principles informing a sphere of operations are brought into conscious awareness and are transformed into explicit objects of new operations. Developmentally, this is the process of discovery that takes place from the earliest stages of life, in utero. Organisms of all kinds mature in a process of interaction with their environments. Young children at the “terrible two” stage, for instance, are realizing that anything they can detach from, whether by throwing or by denying (“No!”), is not part of them. Only a few months earlier, the same children will have been fascinated with their fingers and toes, realizing these are parts of their own bodies, often by putting them in their mouths.

There are as many opportunities for conceptual integrations between the ages of 21 to 99 as there are between birth and 21. Developmental differences in perspectives can make for riotously comic situations, and can also lead to conflicts, even when the participants agree on more than they disagree on. And so here we arrive at a position from which we can get a grip on how to integrate convergence and divergence in a common framework that follows from the prior post’s brief description of the ontological method’s three moments of reduction, application, and deconstruction.

Image

Woolley and colleagues (Woolley, et al., 2010; Woolley and Fuchs, 2011) describe a continuum of five field-organizing activities categorizing the types of information needed for effective collective intelligence (Figure 1). Four of these five activities (defining, bounding, opening, and bridging) vary in the convergent versus divergent processes they bring to bear in collective thinking. Defining and bounding are convergent processes that inform judgment and decision making. These activities are especially important in the emergence of a new field or organization, when the object of interest and the methods of recognizing and producing it are in contention. Opening and bridging activities, in contrast, diverge from accepted definitions and transgress boundaries in the creative process of pushing into new areas. Undergirding the continuum as a whole is the fifth activity, grounding, which serves as a theory- and evidence-informed connection to meaningful and useful results.

There are instances in which defining and bounding activities have progressed to the point that the explanatory power of theory enables the calibration of test items from knowledge of the component parts included in those items. The efficiencies and cost reductions gained from computer-based item generation and administration are significant. Research in this area takes a variety of approaches; for more information, see Daniel and Embretson (2010), DeBoeck and Wilson (2004), Stenner, et al. (2013), and others.

The value of clear definitions and boundaries in this context stems in large part from the capacity to identify exceptions that prove (test) the rules, and that then also provide opportunities for opening and bridging. Kuhn (1961, p. 180; 1977, p. 205) noted that

To the extent that measurement and quantitative technique play an especially significant role in scientific discovery, they do so precisely because, by displaying significant anomaly, they tell scientists when and where to look for a new qualitative phenomenon.

Rasch (1960, p. 124) similarly understood that “Once a law has been established within a certain field then the law itself may serve as a tool for deciding whether or not added stimuli and/or objects belong to the original group.” Rasch gives the example of mechanical force applied to various masses with resulting accelerations, introducing idea that one of the instruments might exert magnetic as well as mechanical force, with noticeable effects on steel masses, but not on wooden masses. Rasch suggests that exploration of these anomalies may result in the discovery of other similar instruments that vary in the extent to which they also exert the new force, with the possible consequence of discovering a law of magnetic attraction.

There has been an intense interest in the assessment of divergent inconsistencies in measurement research and practice following in the wake of Rasch’s early work in psychological and social measurement (examples from a very large literature in this area include Karabatsos and Ulrich, 2002, and Smith and Plackner, 2009). Andrich, for instance, makes explicit reference to Kuhn (1961), saying, “…the function of a model for measurement…is to disclose anomalies, not merely to describe data” (Andrich, 2002, p. 352; also see Andrich, 1996, 2004, 2011). Typical software for applying Rasch models (Andrich, et al., 2013; Linacre, 2011, 2013; Wu, et al., 2007) thus accordingly provides many more qualitative numbers evaluating potential anomalies than quantitative measuring numbers. These qualitative numbers (digits that do not stand for something substantive that adds up in a constant unit) include uncertainty and confidence indicators that vary with sample size; mean square and standardized model fit statistics; and principal components analysis factor loadings and eigenvalues.

The opportunities for divergent openings onto new qualitative phenomena provided by data consistency evaluations are complemented in Rasch measurement by a variety of bridging activities. Different instruments intended to measure the same or closely related constructs may often be equated or co-calibrated, so they measure in a common unit (among many publications in this area, see Dawson, 2002a, 2004; Fisher, 1997; Fisher, et al., 1995; Massof and Ahmadian, 2007; Smith and Taylor, 2004). Similarly, the same instrument calibrated on different samples from the same population may exhibit consistent properties across those samples, offering further evidence of a potential for defining a common unit (Fisher, 1999).

Other opening and bridging activities include capacities (a) to drop items or questions from a test or survey, or to add them; (b) to adaptively administer subsets of custom-selected items from a large bank; and (c) to adjust measures for the leniency or severity of judges assigning ratings, all of which can be done, within the limits of the relevant definitions and boundaries, without compromising the unit of comparison. For methodological overviews, see Bond and Fox (2007), Wilson (2005), and others.

The various field-organizing activities spanning the range from convergence to divergence are implicated not only in research on collective thinking, but also in the history and philosophy of science. Galison and colleagues (Galison, 1997, 1999; Galison and Stump, 1996) closely examine positivist and antipositivist perspectives on the unity of science, finding their conclusions inconsistent with the evidence of history. A postpositivist perspective (Galison, 1999, p. 138), in contrast, finds “distinct communities and incommensurable beliefs” between and often within the areas of theory, experiment, and instrument-making. But instead of finding these communities “utterly condemned to passing one another without any possibility of significant interaction,” Galison (1999, p. 138) observes that “two groups can agree on rules of exchange even if they ascribe utterly different significance to the objects being exchanged; they may even disagree on the meaning of the exchange process itself.” In practice, “trading partners can hammer out a local coordination despite vast global differences.”

In accord with Woolley and colleagues’ work on convergent and divergent field-organizing activities, Galison (1999, p. 137) concludes, then, that “science is disunified, and—against our first intuitions—it is precisely the disunification of science that underpins its strength and stability.” Galison (1997, pp. 843-844) concludes with a section entitled “Cables, Bricks, and Metaphysics” in which the postpositivist disunity of science is seen to provide its unexpected coherence from the simultaneously convergent and divergent ways theories, experiments, and instruments interact.

But as Galison recognizes, a metaphor based on the intertwined strands in a cable is too mechanical to support the dynamic processes by which order arises from particular kinds of noise and chaos. Not cited by Galison is a burgeoning literature on the phenomenon of noise-induced order termed stochastic resonance (Andò  and Graziani 2000, Benzi, et al., 1981; Dykman and McClintock, 1998; Fisher, 1992, 2011; Hess and Albano, 1998; Repperger and Farris, 2010). Where the metaphor of a cable’s strands breaks down, stochastic resonance provides multiple ways of illustrating how the disorder of finite and partially independent processes can give rise to an otherwise inaccessible order and structure.

Stochastic resonance involves small noisy signals that can be amplified to have very large effects. The noise has to be of a particular kind, and too much of it will drown out rather than amplify the effect. Examples include the interaction of neuronal ensembles in the brain (Chialvo, Lontin, and Müller-Gerking, 1996), speech recognition (Moskowitz and Dickinson, 2002), and perceptual interpretation (Rianni and Simonotto, 1994). Given that Rasch’s models for measurement are stochastic versions of Guttman’s deterministic models (Andrich, 1985), the question has been raised as to how Rasch’s seemingly weaker assumptions could lead to a measurement model that is stronger than Guttman’s (Duncan, 1984, p. 220). Stochastic resonance may provide an essential clue to this puzzle (Fisher, 1992, 2011).

Another description of what might be a manifestation of stochastic resonance akin to that brought up by Galison arises in Berg and Timmermans’ (2000, p. 56) study of the constitution of universalities in a medical network. They note that, “Paradoxically, then, the increased stability and reach of this network was not due to more (precise) instructions: the protocol’s logistics could thrive only by parasitically drawing upon its own disorder.” Much the same has been said about the behaviors of markets (Mandelbrot, 2004), bringing us back to the topic of the day at Convergence XV earlier this week. I’ll have more to say on this issue of universalities constituted via noise-induced order in due course.

References

Andò, B., & Graziani, S. (2000). Stochastic resonance theory and applications. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Andrich, D. (1985). An elaboration of Guttman scaling with Rasch models for measurement. In N. B. Tuma (Ed.), Sociological methodology 1985 (pp. 33-80). San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass.

Andrich, D. (1996). Measurement criteria for choosing among models with graded responses. In A. von Eye & C. Clogg (Eds.), Categorical variables in developmental research: Methods of analysis (pp. 3-35). New York: Academic Press, Inc.

Andrich, D. (2002). Understanding resistance to the data-model relationship in Rasch’s paradigm: A reflection for the next generation. Journal of Applied Measurement, 3(3), 325-359.

Andrich, D. (2004, January). Controversy and the Rasch model: A characteristic of incompatible paradigms? Medical Care, 42(1), I-7–I-16.

Andrich, D. (2011). Rating scales and Rasch measurement. Expert Reviews in Pharmacoeconomics Outcome Research, 11(5), 571-585.

Andrich, D., Lyne, A., Sheridan, B., & Luo, G. (2013). RUMM 2030: Rasch unidimensional models for measurement. Perth, Australia: RUMM Laboratory Pty Ltd [www.rummlab.com.au].

Benzi, R., Sutera, A., & Vulpiani, A. (1981). The mechanism of stochastic resonance. Journal of Physics. A. Mathematical and General, 14, L453-L457.

Berg, M., & Timmermans, S. (2000). Order and their others: On the constitution of universalities in medical work. Configurations, 8(1), 31-61.

Bond, T., & Fox, C. (2007). Applying the Rasch model: Fundamental measurement in the human sciences, 2d edition. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Chialvo, D., Longtin, A., & Müller-Gerking, J. (1996). Stochastic resonance in models of neuronal ensembles revisited [Electronic version].

Daniel, R. C., & Embretson, S. E. (2010). Designing cognitive complexity in mathematical problem-solving items. Applied Psychological Measurement, 34(5), 348-364.

Dawson, T. L. (2002a, Summer). A comparison of three developmental stage scoring systems. Journal of Applied Measurement, 3(2), 146-89.

Dawson, T. L. (2002b, March). New tools, new insights: Kohlberg’s moral reasoning stages revisited. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 26(2), 154-66.

Dawson, T. L. (2004, April). Assessing intellectual development: Three approaches, one sequence. Journal of Adult Development, 11(2), 71-85.

Dawson, T. L., Fischer, K. W., & Stein, Z. (2006). Reconsidering qualitative and quantitative research approaches: A cognitive developmental perspective. New Ideas in Psychology, 24, 229-239.

De Boeck, P., & Wilson, M. (Eds.). (2004). Explanatory item response models: A generalized linear and nonlinear approach. Statistics for Social and Behavioral Sciences). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Duncan, O. D. (1984). Notes on social measurement: Historical and critical. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Dykman, M. I., & McClintock, P. V. E. (1998, January 22). What can stochastic resonance do? Nature, 391(6665), 344.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (1992, Spring). Stochastic resonance and Rasch measurement. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 5(4), 186-187 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt54k.htm].

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (1997). Physical disability construct convergence across instruments: Towards a universal metric. Journal of Outcome Measurement, 1(2), 87-113.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (1999). Foundations for health status metrology: The stability of MOS SF-36 PF-10 calibrations across samples. Journal of the Louisiana State Medical Society, 151(11), 566-578.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2011). Stochastic and historical resonances of the unit in physics and psychometrics. Measurement: Interdisciplinary Research & Perspectives, 9, 46-50.

Fisher, W. P., Jr., Harvey, R. F., Taylor, P., Kilgore, K. M., & Kelly, C. K. (1995, February). Rehabits: A common language of functional assessment. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 76(2), 113-122.

Galison, P. (1997). Image and logic: A material culture of microphysics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Galison, P. (1999). Trading zone: Coordinating action and belief. In M. Biagioli (Ed.), The science studies reader (pp. 137-160). New York: Routledge.

Galison, P., & Stump, D. J. (1996). The disunity of science: Boundaries, contexts, and power. Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press.

Hess, S. M., & Albano, A. M. (1998, February). Minimum requirements for stochastic resonance in threshold systems. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, 8(2), 395-400.

Karabatsos, G., & Ullrich, J. R. (2002). Enumerating and testing conjoint measurement models. Mathematical Social Sciences, 43, 487-505.

Kuhn, T. S. (1961). The function of measurement in modern physical science. Isis, 52(168), 161-193. (Rpt. in T. S. Kuhn, (Ed.). (1977). The essential tension: Selected studies in scientific tradition and change (pp. 178-224). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.)

Linacre, J. M. (2011). A user’s guide to WINSTEPS Rasch-Model computer program, v. 3.72.0. Chicago, Illinois: Winsteps.com.

Linacre, J. M. (2013). A user’s guide to FACETS Rasch-Model computer program, v. 3.71.0. Chicago, Illinois: Winsteps.com.

Mandelbrot, B. (2004). The misbehavior of markets. New York: Basic Books.

Massof, R. W., & Ahmadian, L. (2007, July). What do different visual function questionnaires measure? Ophthalmic Epidemiology, 14(4), 198-204.

Moskowitz, M. T., & Dickinson, B. W. (2002). Stochastic resonance in speech recognition: Differentiating between /b/ and /v/. Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, 3, 855-858.

Rasch, G. (1960). Probabilistic models for some intelligence and attainment tests (Reprint, with Foreword and Afterword by B. D. Wright, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Copenhagen, Denmark: Danmarks Paedogogiske Institut.

Repperger, D. W., & Farris, K. A. (2010, July). Stochastic resonance –a nonlinear control theory interpretation. International Journal of Systems Science, 41(7), 897-907.

Riani, M., & Simonotto, E. (1994). Stochastic resonance in the perceptual interpretation of ambiguous figures: A neural network model. Physical Review Letters, 72(19), 3120-3123.

Smith, R. M., & Plackner, C. (2009). The family approach to assessing fit in Rasch measurement. Journal of Applied Measurement, 10(4), 424-437.

Smith, R. M., & Taylor, P. (2004). Equating rehabilitation outcome scales: Developing common metrics. Journal of Applied Measurement, 5(3), 229-42.

Stenner, A. J., Fisher, W. P., Jr., Stone, M. H., & Burdick, D. S. (2013, August). Causal Rasch models. Frontiers in Psychology: Quantitative Psychology and Measurement, 4(536), 1-14 [doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00536].

Wilson, M. (2005). Constructing measures: An item response modeling approach. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Woolley, A. W., Chabris, C. F., Pentland, A., Hashmi, N., & Malone, T. W. (2010, 29 October). Evidence for a collective intelligence factor in the performance of human groups. Science, 330, 686-688.

Woolley, A. W., & Fuchs, E. (2011, September-October). Collective intelligence in the organization of science. Organization Science, 22(5), 1359-1367.

Wu, M. L., Adams, R. J., Wilson, M. R., Haldane, S.A. (2007). ACER ConQuest Version 2: Generalised item response modelling software. Camberwell: Australian Council for Educational Research.

Externalities are to markets as anomalies are to scientific laws

October 28, 2011

Economic externalities are to efficient markets as any consistent anomaly is relative to a lawful regularity. Government intervention in markets is akin to fudging the laws of physics to explain the wobble in Uranus’ orbit, or to explain why magnetized masses would not behave like wooden or stone masses in a metal catapult (Rasch’s example). Further, government intervention in markets is necessary only as long as efficient markets for externalized forms of capital are not created. The anomalous exceptions to the general rule of market efficiency have long since been shown to themselves be internally consistent lawful regularities in their own right amenable to configuration as markets for human, social and natural forms of capital.

There is an opportunity here for the concise and elegant statement of the efficient markets hypothesis, the observation of certain anomalies, the formulation of new theories concerning these forms of capital, the framing of efficient markets hypotheses concerning the behavior of these anomalies, tests of these hypotheses in terms of the inverse proportionality of two of the parameters relative to the third, proposals as to the uniform metrics by which the scientific laws will be made commercially viable expressions of capital value, etc.

We suffer from the illusion that trading activity somehow spontaneously emerges from social interactions. It’s as though comparable equivalent value is some kind of irrefutable, incontestable feature of the world to which humanity adapts its institutions. But this order of things plainly puts the cart before the horse when the emergence of markets is viewed historically. The idea of fair trade, how it is arranged, how it is recognized, when it is appropriate, etc. varies markedly across cultures and over time.

Yes, “’the price of things is in inverse ratio to the quantity offered and in direct ratio to the quantity demanded’ (Walras 1965, I, 216-17)” (Mirowski, 1988, p. 20). Yes, Pareto made “a direct extrapolation of the path-independence of equilibrium energy states in rational mechanics and thermodynamics” to “the path-independence of the realization of utility” (Mirowski, 1988, p. 21). Yes, as Ehrenfest showed, “an analogy between thermodynamics and economics” can be made, and economic concepts can be formulated “as parallels of thermodynamic concepts, with the concept of equilibrium occupying the central position in both theories” (Boumans, 2005, p. 31).  But markets are built up around these lawful regularities by skilled actors who articulate the rules, embody the roles, and initiate the relationships comprising economic, legal, and scientific institutions. “The institutions define the market, rather than the reverse” (Miller & O’Leary, 2007, p. 710). What we need are new institutions built up around the lawful regularities revealed by Rasch models. The problem is how to articulate the rules, embody the roles, and initiate the relationships.

Noyes (1936, pp. 2, 13; quoted in De Soto 2000, p. 158) provides some useful pointers:

“The chips in the economic game today are not so much the physical goods and actual services that are almost exclusively considered in economic text books, as they are that elaboration of legal relations which we call property…. One is led, by studying its development, to conceive the social reality as a web of intangible bonds–a cobweb of invisible filaments–which surround and engage the individual and which thereby organize society…. And the process of coming to grips with the actual world we live in is the process of objectivizing these relations.”

 Noyes (1936, p. 20, quoted in De Soto 2000, p. 163) continues:

“Human nature demands regularity and certainty and this demand requires that these primitive judgments be consistent and thus be permitted to crystallize into certain rules–into ‘this body of dogma or systematized prediction which we call law.’ … The practical convenience of the public … leads to the recurrent efforts to systematize the body of laws. The demand for codification is a demand of the people to be released from the mystery and uncertainty of unwritten or even of case law.” [This is quite an apt statement of the largely unstated demands of the Occupy Wall Street movement.]

  De Soto (2000, p. 158) explains:

 “Lifting the bell jar [integrating legal and extralegal property rights], then, is principally a legal challenge. The official legal order must interact with extralegal arrangements outside the bell jar to create a social contract on property and capital. To achieve this integration, many other disciplines are of course necessary … [economists, urban planners, agronomists, mappers, surveyers, IT specialists, etc]. But ultimately, an integrated national social contract will be concretized only in laws.”

  “Implementing major legal change is a political responsibility. There are various reasons for this. First, law is generally concerned with protecting property rights. However, the real task in developing and former communist countries is not so much to perfect existing rights as to give everyone a right to property rights–‘meta-rights,’ if you will. [Paraphrasing, the real task in the undeveloped domains of human, social, and natural capital is not so much the perfection of existing rights as it is to harness scientific measurement in the name of economic justice and grant everyone legal title to their shares of their ownmost personal properties, their abilities, health, motivations, and trustworthiness, along with their shares of the common stock of social and natural resources.] Bestowing such meta-rights, emancipating people from bad law, is a political job. Second, very small but powerful vested interests–mostly repre- [p. 159] sented by the countries best commercial lawyers–are likely to oppose change unless they are convinced otherwise. Bringing well-connected and moneyed people onto the bandwagon requires not consultants committed to serving their clients but talented politicians committed to serving their people. Third, creating an integrated system is not about drafting laws and regulations that look good on paper but rather about designing norms that are rooted in people’s beliefs and are thus more likely to be obeyed and enforced. Being in touch with real people is a politician’s task. Fourth, prodding underground economies to become legal is a major political sales job.”

 De Soto continues (p. 159), intending to refer only to real estate but actually speaking of the need for formal legal title to personal property of all kinds, which ought to include human, social, and natural capital:

  “Without succeeding on these legal and political fronts, no nation can overcome the legal apartheid between those who can create capital and those who cannot. Without formal property, no matter how many assets they accumulate or how hard they work, most people will not be able to prosper in a capitalist society. They will continue to remain beyond the radar of policymakers, out of the reach of official records, and thus economically invisible.”

Boumans, M. (2005). How economists model the world into numbers. New York: Routledge.

De Soto, H. (2000). The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else. New York: Basic Books.

Miller, P., & O’Leary, T. (2007, October/November). Mediating instruments and making markets: Capital budgeting, science and the economy. Accounting, Organizations, and Society, 32(7-8), 701-34.

Mirowski, P. (1988). Against mechanism: Protecting economics from science. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Noyes, C. R. (1936). The institution of property. New York: Longman’s Green.

Creative Commons License
LivingCapitalMetrics Blog by William P. Fisher, Jr., Ph.D. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Based on a work at livingcapitalmetrics.wordpress.com.
Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://www.livingcapitalmetrics.com.

Reimagining Capitalism Again, Part II: Scientific Credibility in Improving Information Quality

September 10, 2011

The previous posting here concluded with two questions provoked by a close consideration of a key passage in William Greider’s 2003 book, The Soul of Capitalism. First, how do we create the high quality, solid information markets need to punish and reward relative to ethical and sustainable human, social, and environmental values? Second, what can we learn from the way we created that kind of information for property and manufactured capital? There are good answers to these questions, answers that point in productive directions in need of wide exploration and analysis.

The short answer to both questions is that better, more scientifically rigorous measurement at the local level needs to be implemented in a context of traceability to universally uniform standards. To think global and act local simultaneously, we need an efficient and transparent way of seeing where we stand in the world relative to everyone else. Having measures expressed in comparable and meaningful units is an important part of how we think global while acting local.

So, for markets to punish and reward businesses in ways able to build human, social, and environmental value, we need to be able to price that value, to track returns on investments in it, and to own shares of it. To do that, we need a new intangible assets metric system that functions in a manner analogous to the existing metric system and other weights and measures standards. In the same way these standards guarantee high quality information on volume, weight, thermal units, and volts in grocery stores and construction sites, we need a new set of standards for human abilities, performances, and health; for social trust, commitment, and loyalty; and for the environment’s air and water processing services, fisheries, gene pools, etc.

Each industry needs an instrumentarium of tools and metrics that mediate relationships universally within its entire sphere of production and/or service. The obvious and immediate reaction to this proposal will likely be that this is impossible, that it would have been done by now if it was possible, and that anyone who proposes something like this is simply unrealistic, perhaps dangerously so. So, here we have another reason to add to those given in the June 8, 2011 issue of The Nation (http://www.thenation.com/article/161267/reimagining-capitalism-bold-ideas-new-economy) as to why bold ideas for a new economy cannot gain any traction in today’s political discourse.

So what basis in scientific authority might be found for this audacious goal of an intangible assets metric system? This blog’s postings offer multiple varieties of evidence and argument in this regard, so I’ll stick to more recent developments, namely, last week’s meeting of the International Measurement Confederation (IMEKO) in Jena, Germany. Membership in IMEKO is dominated by physicists, engineers, chemists, and clinical laboratorians who work in private industry, academia, and government weights and measures standards institutes.

Several IMEKO members past and present are involved with one or more of the seven or eight major international standards organizations responsible for maintaining and improving the metric system (the Systeme Internationale des Unites). Two initiatives undertaken by IMEKO and these standards organizations take up the matter at issue here concerning the audacious goal of standard units for human, social, and natural capital.

First, the recently released third edition of the International Vocabulary of Measurement (VIM, 2008) expands the range of the concepts and terms included to encompass measurement in the human and social sciences. This first effort was not well informed as to the nature of widely realized state of the art developments in measurement in education, health care, and the social sciences. What is important is that an invitation to further dialogue has been extended from the natural to the social sciences.

That invitation was unintentionally accepted and a second initiative advanced just as the new edition of the VIM was being released, in 2008. Members of three IMEKO technical committees (TC 1-7-13; those on Measurement Science, Metrology Education, and Health Care) cultivate a special interest in ideas on the human and social value of measurement. At their 2008 meeting in Annecy, France, I presented a paper (later published in revised form as Fisher, 2009) illustrating how, over the previous 50 years and more, the theory and practice of measurement in the social sciences had developed in ways capable of supporting convenient and useful universally uniform units for human, social, and natural capital.

The same argument was then advanced by my fellow University of Chicago alum, Nikolaus Bezruczko, at the 2009 IMEKO World Congress in Lisbon. Bezruczko and I both spoke at the 2010 TC 1-7-13 meeting in London, and last week our papers were joined by presentations from six of our colleagues at the 2011 IMEKO TC 1-7-13 meeting in Jena, Germany. Another fellow U Chicagoan, Mark Wilson, a long time professor in the Graduate School of Education at the University of California, Berkeley, gave an invited address contrasting four basic approaches to measurement in psychometrics, and emphasizing the value of methods that integrate substantive meaning with mathematical rigor.

Examples from education, health care, and business were then elucidated at this year’s meeting in Jena by myself, Bezruczko, Stefan Cano (University of Plymouth, England), Carl Granger (SUNY, Buffalo; paper presented by Bezruczko, a co-author), Thomas Salzberger (University of Vienna, Austria), Jack Stenner (MetaMetrics, Inc., Durham, NC, USA), and Gordon Cooper (University of Western Australia, Crawley, WA, Australia; paper presented by Fisher, a co-author).

The contrast between these presentations and those made by the existing IMEKO membership hinges on two primary differences in focus. The physicists and engineers take it for granted that all instrument calibration involves traceability to metrological reference standards. Dealing as they are with existing standards and physical or chemical materials that usually possess deterministically structured properties, issues of how to construct linear measures from ordinal observations never come up.

Conversely, the social scientists and psychometricians take it for granted that all instrument calibration involves evaluations of the capacity of ordinal observations to support the construction of linear measures. Dealing as they are with data from tests, surveys, and rating scale assessments, issues of how to relate a given instrument’s unit to a reference standard never come up.

Thus there is significant potential for mutually instructive dialogue between natural and social scientists in this context. Many areas of investigation in the natural sciences have benefited from the introduction of probabilistic concepts in recent decades, but there are perhaps important unexplored opportunities for the application of probabilistic measurement, as opposed to statistical, models. By taking advantage of probabilistic models’ special features, measurement in education and health care has begun to realize the benefit of broad generalizations of comparable units across grades, schools, tests, and curricula.

Though the focus of my interest here is in the capacity of better measurement to improve the efficiency of human, social, and natural capital markets, it may turn out that as many or more benefits will accrue in the natural sciences’ side of the conversation as in the social sciences’ side. The important thing for the time being is that the dialogue is started. New and irreversible mutual understandings between natural and social scientists have already been put on the record. It may happen that the introduction of a new supply of improved human, social, and natural capital metrics will help articulate the largely, as yet, unstated but nonetheless urgent demand for them.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2009, November). Invariance and traceability for measures of human, social, and natural capital: Theory and application. Measurement, 42(9), 1278-1287.

Creative Commons License
LivingCapitalMetrics Blog by William P. Fisher, Jr., Ph.D. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Based on a work at livingcapitalmetrics.wordpress.com.
Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://www.livingcapitalmetrics.com.

Reimagining Capitalism Again, Part I: Reflections on Greider’s Soul of Capitalism

September 10, 2011

In his 2003 book, The Soul of Capitalism, William Greider wrote, “If capitalism were someday found to have a soul, it would probably be located in the mystic qualities of capital itself” (p. 94). The recurring theme in the book is that the resolution of capitalism’s deep conflicts must grow out as organic changes from the roots of capitalism itself.

In the book, Greider quotes Innovest’s Michael Kiernan as suggesting that the goal has to be re-engineering the DNA of Wall Street (p. 119). He says the key to doing this is good reliable information that has heretofore been unavailable but which will make social and environmental issues matter financially. The underlying problems of exactly what solid, high quality information looks like, where it comes from, and how it is created are not stated or examined, but the point, as Kiernan says, is that “the markets are pretty good at punishing and rewarding.” The objective is to use “the financial markets as an engine of reform and positive change rather than destruction.”

This objective is, of course, the focus of multiple postings in this blog (see especially this one and this one). From my point of view, capitalism indeed does have a soul and it is actually located in the qualities of capital itself. Think about it: if a soul is a spirit of something that exists independent of its physical manifestation, then the soul of capitalism is the fungibility of capital. Now, this fungibility is complex and ambiguous. It takes its strength and practical value from the way market exchange are represented in terms of currencies, monetary units that, within some limits, provide an objective basis of comparison useful for rewarding those capable of matching supply with demand.

But the fungibility of capital can also be dangerously misconceived when the rich complexity and diversity of human capital is unjustifiably reduced to labor, when the irreplaceable value of natural capital is unjustifiably reduced to land, and when the trust, loyalty, and commitment of social capital is completely ignored in financial accounting and economic models. As I’ve previously said in this blog, the concept of human capital is inherently immoral so far as it reduces real human beings to interchangeable parts in an economic machine.

So how could it ever be possible to justify any reduction of human, social, and natural value to a mere number? Isn’t this the ultimate in the despicable inhumanity of economic logic, corporate decision making, and, ultimately, the justification of greed? Many among us who profess liberal and progressive perspectives seem to have an automatic and reactionary prejudice of this kind. This makes these well-intentioned souls as much a part of the problem as those among us with sometimes just as well-intentioned perspectives that accept such reductionism as the price of entry into the game.

There is another way. Human, social, and natural value can be measured and made manageable in ways that do not necessitate totalizing reduction to a mere number. The problem is not reduction itself, but unjustified, totalizing reduction. Referring to all people as “man” or “men” is an unjustified reduction dangerous in the way it focuses attention only on males. The tendency to think and act in ways privileging males over females that is fostered by this sense of “man” shortchanges us all, and has happily been largely eliminated from discourse.

Making language more inclusive does not, however, mean that words lose the singular specificity they need to be able to refer to things in the world. Any given word represents an infinite population of possible members of a class of things, actions, and forms of life. Any simple sentence combining words into a coherent utterance then multiplies infinities upon infinities. Discourse inherently reduces multiplicities into texts of limited lengths.

Like any tool, reduction has its uses. Also like any tool, problems arise when the tool is allowed to occupy some hidden and unexamined blind spot from which it can dominate and control the way we think about everything. Critical thinking is most difficult in those instances in which the tools of thinking themselves need to be critically evaluated. To reject reduction uncritically as inherently unjustified is to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Indeed, it is impossible to formulate a statement of the rejection without simultaneously enacting exactly what is supposed to be rejected.

We have numerous ready-to-hand examples of how all reduction has been unjustifiably reduced to one homogenized evil. But one of the results of experiments in communal living in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as of the fall of the Soviet Union, was the realization that the centralized command and control of collectively owned community property cannot compete with the creativity engendered when individuals hold legal title to the fruits of their labors. If individuals cannot own the results of the investments they make, no one makes any investments.

In other words, if everything is owned collectively and is never reduced to individually possessed shares that can be creatively invested for profitable returns, then the system is structured so as to punish innovation and reward doing as little as possible. But there’s another way of thinking about the relation of the collective to the individual. The living soul of capitalism shows itself in the way high quality information makes it possible for markets to efficiently coordinate and align individual producers’ and consumers’ collective behaviors and decisions. What would happen if we could do that for human, social, and natural capital markets? What if “social capitalism” is more than an empty metaphor? What if capital institutions can be configured so that individual profit really does become the driver of socially responsible, sustainable economics?

And here we arrive at the crux of the problem. How do we create the high quality, solid information markets need to punish and reward relative to ethical and sustainable human, social, and environmental values? Well, what can we learn from the way we created that kind of information for property and manufactured capital? These are the questions taken up and explored in the postings in this blog, and in my scientific research publications and meeting presentations. In the near future, I’ll push my reflection on these questions further, and will explore some other possible answers to the questions offered by Greider and his readers in a recent issue of The Nation.

Creative Commons License
LivingCapitalMetrics Blog by William P. Fisher, Jr., Ph.D. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Based on a work at livingcapitalmetrics.wordpress.com.
Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://www.livingcapitalmetrics.com.

New Opportunities for Job Creation and Prosperity

August 17, 2011

What can be done to create jobs and revive the economy? There is no simple, easy answer to this question. Creating busywork is nonsense. We need fulfilling occupations that meet the world’s demand for products and services. It is not easy to see how meaningful work can be systematically created on a broad scale. New energy efficiencies may lead to the cultivation of significant job growth, but it may be unwise to put all of our eggs in this one basket.

So how are we to solve this puzzle? What other areas in the economy might be ripe for the introduction of a new technology capable of supporting a wave of new productivity, like computers did in the 1980s, or the Internet in the 1990s? In trying to answer this question, simplicity and elegance are key factors in keeping things at a practical level.

For instance, we know we accomplish more working together as a team than as disconnected individuals. New jobs, especially new kinds of jobs, will have to be created via innovation. Innovation in science and industry is a team sport. So the first order of business in teaming up for job creation is to know the rules of the game. The economic game is played according to the rules of law embodied in property rights, scientific rationality, capital markets, and transportation/communications networks (see William Bernstein’s 2004 book, The Birth of Plenty). When these conditions are met, as they were in Europe and North America at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the stage is set for long term innovation and growth on a broad scale.

The second order of business is to identify areas in the economy that lack one or more of these four conditions, and that could reasonably be expected to benefit from their introduction. Education, health care, social services, and environmental management come immediately to mind. These industries are plagued with seemingly interminable inflationary spirals, which, no doubt, are at least in part caused by the inability of investors to distinguish between high and low performers. Money cannot flow to and reward programs producing superior results in these industries because they lack common product definitions and comparable measures of their results.

The problems these industries are experiencing are not specific to each of them in particular. Rather, the problem is a general one applicable across all industries, not just these. Traditionally, economic thinking focuses on three main forms of capital: land, labor, and manufactured products (including everything from machines, roads, and buildings to food, clothing, and appliances). Cash and credit are often thought of as liquid capital, but their economic value stems entirely from the access they provide to land, labor, and manufactured products.

Economic activity is not really, however, restricted to these three forms of capital. Land is far more than a piece of ground. What are actually at stake are the earth’s regenerative ecosystems, with the resources and services they provide. And labor is far more than a pair of skilled hands; people bring a complex mix of abilities, motivations, and health to bear in their work. Finally, this scheme lacks an essential element: the trust, loyalty, and commitment required for even the smallest economic exchange to take place. Without social capital, all the other forms of capital (human, natural, and manufactured, including property) are worthless. Consistent, sustainable, and socially responsible economic growth requires that all four forms of capital be made accountable in financial spreadsheets and economic models.

The third order of business, then, is to ask if the four conditions laying out the rules for the economic game are met in each of the four capital domains. The table below suggests that all four conditions are fully met only for manufactured products. They are partially met for natural resources, such as minerals, timber, fisheries, etc., but not at all for nature’s air and water purification systems or broader genetic ecosystem services.

 Table

Existing Conditions Relevant to Conceiving a New Birth of Plenty, by Capital Domains

Human

Social

Natural

Manufactured

Property rights

No

No

Partial

Yes

Scientific rationality

Partial

Partial

Partial

Yes

Capital markets

Partial

Partial

Partial

Yes

Transportation & communication networks

Partial

Partial

Partial

Yes

That is, no provisions exist for individual ownership of shares in the total available stock of air and water, or of forest, watershed, estuary, and other ecosystem service outcomes. Nor do any individuals have free and clear title to their most personal properties, the intangible abilities, motivations, health, and trust most essential to their economic productivity. Aggregate statistics are indeed commonly used to provide a basis for policy and research in human, social, and natural capital markets, but falsifiable models of individually applicable unit quantities are not widely applied. Scientifically rational measures of our individual stocks of intangible asset value will require extensive use of these falsifiable models in calibrating the relevant instrumentation.

Without such measures, we cannot know how many shares of stock in these forms of capital we own, or what they are worth in dollar terms. We lack these measures, even though decades have passed since researchers first established firm theoretical and practical foundations for them. And more importantly, even when scientifically rational individual measures can be obtained, they are never expressed in terms of a unit standardized for use within a given market’s communications network.

So what are the consequences for teams playing the economic game? High performance teams’ individual decisions and behaviors are harmonized in ways that cannot otherwise be achieved only when unit amounts, prices, and costs are universally comparable and publicly available. This is why standard currencies and exchange rates are so important.

And right here we have an insight into what we can do to create jobs. New jobs are likely going to have to be new kinds of jobs resulting from innovations. As has been detailed at length in recent works such as Surowiecki’s 2004 book, The Wisdom of Crowds, innovation in science and industry depends on standards. Standards are common languages that enable us to multiply our individual cognitive powers into new levels of collective productivity. Weights and measures standards are like monetary currencies; they coordinate the exchange of value in laboratories and businesses in the same way that dollars do in the US economy.

Applying Bernstein’s four conditions for economic growth to intangible assets, we see that a long term program for job creation then requires

  1. legislation establishing human, social, and natural capital property rights, and an Intangible Assets Metrology System;
  2. scientific research into consensus standards for measuring human, social, and natural capital;
  3. venture capital educational and marketing programs; and
  4. distributed information networks and computer applications through which investments in human, social, and natural capital can be tracked and traded in accord with the rule of law governing property rights and in accord with established consensus standards.

Of these four conditions, Bernstein (p. 383) points to property rights as being the most difficult to establish, and the most important for prosperity. Scientific results are widely available in online libraries. Capital can be obtained from investors anywhere. Transportation and communications services are available commercially.

But valid and verifiable means of representing legal title to privately owned property is a problem often not yet solved even for real estate in many Third World and former communist countries (see De Soto’s 2000 book, The Mystery of Capital). Creating systems for knowing the quality and quantity of educational, health care, social, and environmental service outcomes is going to be a very difficult process. It will not be impossible, however, and having the problem identified advances us significantly towards new economic possibilities.

We need leaders able and willing to formulate audacious goals for new economic growth from ideas such as these. We need enlightened visionaries able to see our potentials from a new perspective, and who can reflect our new self-image back at us. When these leaders emerge—and they will, somewhere, somehow—the imaginations of millions of entrepreneurial thinkers and actors will be fired, and new possibilities will unfold.

Creative Commons License
LivingCapitalMetrics Blog by William P. Fisher, Jr., Ph.D. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Based on a work at livingcapitalmetrics.wordpress.com.
Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://www.livingcapitalmetrics.com.

Enchantment, Organizations, and Mediating Instruments: Potential for a New Consensus?

August 3, 2011

I just came across something that could be helpful in regaining some forward momentum and expanding the frame of reference for the research on caring in nursing with Jane Sumner (Sumner & Fisher, 2008). We have yet to really work in the failure of Habermas’ hermeneutic objectivism (Kim, 2002; Thompson, 1984) and we haven’t connected what we’ve done with (a) Ricoeur’s (1984, 1985, 1990, 1995) sense of narrative as describing the past en route to prescribing the future (prefiguring, configuring, and refiguring the creation of meaning in discourse) and with (b) Wright’s (1999) sense of learning from past data to efficiently and effectively anticipate new data within a stable inferential frame of reference.

Now I’ve found a recent publication that resonates well with this goal, and includes examples from nursing to boot. Boje and Baskin (2010; see especially pp. 12-17 in the manuscript available at http://peaceaware.com/vita/paper_pdfs/JOCM_Never_Disenchanted.pdf) cite only secondary literature but do a good job of articulating where the field is at conceptually and in tracing the sources of that articulation.  So they make no mention of Ricoeur on narrative (1984, 1985, 1990) and on play and the heuristic fiction (1981, pp. 185-187), and they make no mention of Gadamer on play as the most important clue to methodological authenticity (1989, pp. 101-134). It follows that they then also do not make any use of the considerable volume of other available and relevant work on the metaphysics of allure, captivation, enthrallment, rapture, beauty, or eros.

This is all very important because these issues are highly salient markers of the distinction between a modern, Cartesian, and mechanical worldview destructive of enchantment and play, and the amodern, nonCartesian, and organic worldview in tune with enchantment and play. As I have stressed repeatedly in these posts, the way we frame problems is now the primary problem, in opposition to those who think identifying and applying resources, techniques, or will power is the problem. It is essential that we learn to frame problems in a way that begins from requirements of subject-object interdependence instead of from assumptions of subject-object independence. Previous posts here explore in greater detail how we are all captivated by the desire for meaning. Any time we choose negotiation or patient waiting over violence, we express faith in the ultimate value of trusting our words. So though Boje and Baskin do not document this larger context, they still effectively show exactly where and how work in the nonCartesian paradigm of enchantment connects up with what’s going on in organizational change management theory.

The paper’s focus on narrative as facilitating enchantment and disenchantment speaks to our fundamental absorption into the play of language. Enchantment is described on page 2 as involving positive connection with existence, of being enthralled with the wonder of being endowed with natural and cultural gifts.  Though not described as such, this hermeneutics of restoration, as Ricoeur (1967) calls it, focuses on the way symbols give rise to thought in an unasked-for assertion of meaningfulness. The structure we see emerge of its own accord across multiple different data sets from tests, surveys, and assessments is an important example of this gift through which previously identified meanings re-assert themselves anew (see my published philosophical work, such as Fisher, 2004). The contrast with disenchantment of course arises as a function of the dead and one-sided modern Cartesian effort aimed at controlling the environment, which effectively eliminates wonder and meaning via a hermeneutics of suspicion.

In accord with the work done to date with Sumner on caring in nursing, the Boje and Baskin paper describes people’s variable willingness to accept disenchantment or demand enchantment (p. 13) in terms that look quite like preconventional and postconventional Kohlbergian stages. A nurse’s need to shift from one dominant narrative form to another is described as very difficult because of the way she had used the one to which she was accustomed to construct her identity as a nurse (p. 15). Bi-directionality between nurses and patients is implied in another example of a narrative shift in a hospital (p. 16). Both identity and bi-directionality are central issues in the research with Sumner.

The paper also touches on the conceptual domain of instrumental realism, as this is developed in the works of Ihde, Latour, Heelan and others (on p. 6; again, without citing them), and emphasizes a nonCartesian subject-object unity and belongingness, which is described at length in Ricoeur’s work. At the bottom of page 7 and top of 8, storytelling is theorized in terms of retrospection, presentness, and a bet on future meaning, which precisely echoes Ricoeur’s (1984, 1985, 1990) sense of narrative refiguration, configuration, and prefiguration. A connection with measurement comes here, in that what we want is to:

“reach beyond the data in hand to what these data might imply about future data, still unmet, but urgent to foresee. The first problem is how to predict values for these future data, which, by the meaning of inference, are necessarily missing. This meaning of missing must include not only the future data to be inferred but also all possible past data that were lost or never collected” (Wright, 1999, p. 76).

Properly understood and implemented (see previous posts in this blog), measurement based in models of individual behavior provides a way to systematically create an atmosphere of emergent enchantment. Having developmentally sound narratives rooted in individual measures on multiple dimensions over time gives us a shared written history that we can all find ourselves in, and that we can then use to project a vision of a shared future that has reasonable expectations for what’s possible.

This mediation of past and future by means of technical instruments is being described in a way (Miller & O’Leary, 2007) that to me (Fisher & Stenner, 2011) denotes a vital distinction not just between the social and natural sciences, but between economically moribund and inflationary industries such as education, health care, and social services, on the one hand, and economically vibrant and deflationary industries such as microprocessors, on the other.

It is here, and I say this out loud for the first time here, even to myself, that I begin to see the light at the end of the tunnel, to see a way that I might find a sense of closure and resolution in the project I took up over 30 years ago. My puzzle has been one of understanding in theory and practice how it is that measurement and mathematical thinking are nothing but refinements of the logic used in everyday conversation. It only occurs to me now that, if we can focus the conversations that we are in ways that balance meaningfulness and precision, that situate each of us as individuals relative to the larger wholes of who we have been and who we might be, that encompasses both the welcoming Socratic midwife and the annoying Socratic gadfly as different facets of the same framework, and that enable us to properly coordinate and align technical projects involving investments in intangible capital, well, then, we’ll be in a position to more productively engage with the challenges of the day.

There won’t be any panacea but there will be a new consensus and a new infrastructure that, however new they may seem, will enact yet again, in a positive way, the truth of the saying, “the more things change, the more they stay the same.” As I’ve repeatedly argued, the changes we need to implement are nothing but extensions of age-old principles into areas in which they have not yet been applied. We should take some satisfaction from this, as what else could possibly work? The originality of the application does not change the fact that it is rooted in appropriating, via a refiguration, to be sure, a model created for other purposes that works in relation to new purposes.

Another way of putting the question is in terms of that “permanent arbitration between technical universalism and the personality constituted on the ethico-political plane” characteristic of the need to enter into the global technical society while still retaining our roots in our cultural past (Ricoeur, 1974, p. 291). What is needed is the capacity to mediate each individual’s retelling of the grand narrative so that each of us sees ourselves in everyone else, and everyone else in ourselves. Though I am sure the meaning of this is less than completely transparent right now, putting it in writing is enormously satisfying, and I will continue to work on telling the tale as it needs to be told.

 References

Boje, D., & Baskin, K. (2010). Our organizations were never disenchanted: Enchantment by design narratives vs. enchantment by emergence. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 24(4), 411-426.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2004, October). Meaning and method in the social sciences. Human Studies: A Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences, 27(4), 429-54.

Fisher, W. P., Jr., & Stenner, A. J. (2011, August 31 to September 2). A technology roadmap for intangible assets metrology. International Measurement Confederation (IMEKO). Jena, Germany.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1989). Truth and method (J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, Trans.) (Second revised edition). New York: Crossroad.

Kim, K.-M. (2002, May). On the failure of Habermas’s hermeneutic objectivism. Cultural Studies <–> Critical Methodologies, 2(2), 270-98.

Miller, P., & O’Leary, T. (2007, October/November). Mediating instruments and making markets: Capital budgeting, science and the economy. Accounting, Organizations, and Society, 32(7-8), 701-34.

Ricoeur, P. (1967). Conclusion: The symbol gives rise to thought. In R. N. Anshen (Ed.), The symbolism of evil (pp. 347-57). Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press.

Ricoeur, P. (1974). Political and social essays (D. Stewart & J. Bien, Eds.). Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Ricoeur, P. (1981). Hermeneutics and the human sciences: Essays on language, action and interpretation (J. B. Thompson, Ed.) (J. B. Thompson, Trans.). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Ricoeur, P. (1984, 1985, 1990). Time and Narrative, Vols. 1-3 (K. McLaughlin (Blamey) & D. Pellauer, Trans.). Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.

Ricoeur, P. (1995). Reply to Peter Kemp. In L. E. Hahn (Ed.), The philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (pp. 395-398). Chicago, Illinois: Open Court.

Sumner, J., & Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2008). The moral construct of caring in nursing as communicative action: The theory and practice of a caring science. Advances in Nursing Science, 31(4), E19-E36.

Thompson, J. B. (1981). Critical hermeneutics: A study in the thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wright, B. D. (1999). Fundamental measurement for psychology. In S. E. Embretson & S. L. Hershberger (Eds.), The new rules of measurement: What every educator and psychologist should know (pp. 65-104 [http://www.rasch.org/memo64.htm]). Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Creative Commons License
LivingCapitalMetrics Blog by William P. Fisher, Jr., Ph.D. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Based on a work at livingcapitalmetrics.wordpress.com.
Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://www.livingcapitalmetrics.com.

A Framework for Competitive Advantage in Managing Intangible Assets

July 26, 2011

It has long been recognized that externalities like social costs could be brought into the market should ways of measuring them objectively be devised. Markets, however, do not emerge spontaneously from the mere desire to be able to buy and sell; they are, rather, the products of actors and agencies that define the rules, roles, and relationships within which transaction costs are reduced and from which value, profits, and authentic wealth may be extracted. Objective measurement is necessary to reduced transaction costs but is by itself insufficient to the making of markets. Thus, markets for intangible assets, such as human, social, and natural capital, remain inefficient and undeveloped even though scientific theories, models, methods, and results demonstrating their objective measurability have been available for over 80 years.

Why has the science of objectively measured intangible assets not yet led to efficient markets for those assets? The crux of the problem, the pivot point at which an economic Archimedes could move the world of business, has to do with verifiable trust. It may seem like stating the obvious, but there is much to be learned from recognizing that shared narratives of past performance and a shared vision of the future are essential to the atmosphere of trust and verifiability needed for the making of markets. The key factor is the level of detail reliably tapped by such narratives.

For instance, some markets seem to have the weight of an immovable mass when the dominant narrative describes a static past and future with no clearly defined trajectory of leverageable development. But when a path of increasing technical capacity or precision over time can be articulated, entrepreneurs have the time frames they need to be able to coordinate, align, and manage budgeting decisions vis a vis investments, suppliers, manufacturers, marketing, sales, and customers. For example, the building out of the infrastructure of highways, electrical power, and water and sewer services assured manufacturers of automobiles, appliances, and homes that they could develop products for which there would be ready customers. Similarly, the mapping out of a path of steady increases in technical precision at no additional cost in Moore’s Law has been a key factor enabling the microprocessor industry’s ongoing history of success.

Of course, as has been the theme of this blog since day one, similar paths for the development of new infrastructural capacities could be vital factors for making new markets for human, social, and natural capital. I’ll be speaking on this topic at the forthcoming IMEKO meeting in Jena, Germany, August 31 to September 2. Watch this spot for more on this theme in the near future.

Creative Commons License
LivingCapitalMetrics Blog by William P. Fisher, Jr., Ph.D. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Based on a work at livingcapitalmetrics.wordpress.com.
Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://www.livingcapitalmetrics.com.

A Simple Example of How Better Measurement Creates New Market Efficiencies, Reduces Transaction Costs, and Enables the Pricing of Intangible Assets

March 4, 2011

One of the ironies of life is that we often overlook the obvious in favor of the obscure. And so one hears of huge resources poured into finding and capitalizing on opportunities that provide infinitesimally small returns, while other opportunities—with equally certain odds of success but far more profitable returns—are completely neglected.

The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) reports returns on investment ranging from 32% to over 400% in 32 metrological improvements made in semiconductors, construction, automation, computers, materials, manufacturing, chemicals, photonics, communications and pharmaceuticals (NIST, 2009). Previous posts in this blog offer more information on the economic value of metrology. The point is that the returns obtained from improvements in the measurement of tangible assets will likely also be achieved in the measurement of intangible assets.

How? With a little bit of imagination, each stage in the development of increasingly meaningful, efficient, and useful measures described in this previous post can be seen as implying a significant return on investment. As those returns are sought, investors will coordinate and align different technologies and resources relative to a roadmap of how these stages are likely to unfold in the future, as described in this previous post. The basic concepts of how efficient and meaningful measurement reduces transaction costs and market frictions, and how it brings capital to life, are explained and documented in my publications (Fisher, 2002-2011), but what would a concrete example of the new value created look like?

The examples I have in mind hinge on the difference between counting and measuring. Counting is a natural and obvious thing to do when we need some indication of how much of something there is. But counting is not measuring (Cooper & Humphry, 2010; Wright, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1999). This is not some minor academic distinction of no practical use or consequence. It is rather the source of the vast majority of the problems we have in comparing outcome and performance measures.

Imagine how things would be if we couldn’t weigh fruit in a grocery store, and all we could do was count pieces. We can tell when eight small oranges possess less overall mass of fruit than four large ones by weighing them; the eight small oranges might weigh .75 kilograms (about 1.6 pounds) while the four large ones come in at 1.0 kilo (2.2 pounds). If oranges were sold by count instead of weight, perceptive traders would buy small oranges and make more money selling them than they could if they bought large ones.

But we can’t currently arrive so easily at the comparisons we need when we’re buying and selling intangible assets, like those produced as the outcomes of educational, health care, or other services. So I want to walk through a couple of very down-to-earth examples to bring the point home. Today we’ll focus on the simplest version of the story, and tomorrow we’ll take up a little more complicated version, dealing with the counts, percentages, and scores used in balanced scorecard and dashboard metrics of various kinds.

What if you score eight on one reading test and I score four on a different reading test? Who has more reading ability? In the same way that we might be able to tell just by looking that eight small oranges are likely to have less actual orange fruit than four big ones, we might also be able to tell just by looking that eight easy (short, common) words can likely be read correctly with less reading ability than four difficult (long, rare) words can be.

So let’s analyze the difference between buying oranges and buying reading ability. We’ll set up three scenarios for buying reading ability. In all three, we’ll imagine we’re comparing how we buy oranges with the way we would have to go about buying reading ability today if teachers were paid for the gains made on the tests they administer at the beginning and end of the school year.

In the first scenario, the teachers make up their own tests. In the second, the teachers each use a different standardized test. In the third, each teacher uses a computer program that draws questions from the same online bank of precalibrated items to construct a unique test custom tailored to each student. Reading ability scenario one is likely the most commonly found in real life. Scenario three is the rarest, but nonetheless describes a situation that has been available to millions of students in the U.S., Australia, and elsewhere for several years. Scenarios one, two and three correspond with developmental levels one, three, and five described in a previous blog entry.

Buying Oranges

When you go into one grocery store and I go into another, we don’t have any oranges with us. When we leave, I have eight and you have four. I have twice as many oranges as you, but yours weigh a kilo, about a third more than mine (.75 kilos).

When we paid for the oranges, the transaction was finished in a few seconds. Neither one of us experienced any confusion, annoyance, or inconvenience in relation to the quality of information we had on the amount of orange fruits we were buying. I did not, however, pay twice as much as you did. In fact, you paid more for yours than I did for mine, in direct proportion to the difference in the measured amounts.

No negotiations were necessary to consummate the transactions, and there was no need for special inquiries about how much orange we were buying. We knew from experience in this and other stores that the prices we paid were comparable with those offered in other times and places. Our information was cheap, as it was printed on the bag of oranges or could be read off a scale, and it was very high quality, as the measures were directly comparable with measures from any other scale in any other store. So, in buying oranges, the impact of information quality on the overall cost of the transaction was so inexpensive as to be negligible.

Buying Reading Ability (Scenario 1)

So now you and I go through third grade as eight year olds. You’re in one school and I’m in another. We have different teachers. Each teacher makes up his or her own reading tests. When we started the school year, we each took a reading test (different ones), and we took another (again, different ones) as we ended the school year.

For each test, your teacher counted up your correct answers and divided by the total number of questions; so did mine. You got 72% correct on the first one, and 94% correct on the last one. I got 83% correct on the first one, and 86% correct on the last one. Your score went up 22%, much more than the 3% mine went up. But did you learn more? It is impossible to tell. What if both of your tests were easier—not just for you or for me but for everyone—than both of mine? What if my second test was a lot harder than my first one? On the other hand, what if your tests were harder than mine? Perhaps you did even better than your scores seem to indicate.

We’ll just exclude from consideration other factors that might come to bear, such as whether your tests were significantly longer or shorter than mine, or if one of us ran out of time and did not answer a lot of questions.

If our parents had to pay the reading teacher at the end of the school year for the gains that were made, how would they tell what they were getting for their money? What if your teacher gave a hard test at the start of the year and an easy one at the end of the year so that you’d have a big gain and your parents would have to pay more? What if my teacher gave an easy test at the start of the year and a hard one at the end, so that a really high price could be put on very small gains? If our parents were to compare their experiences in buying our improved reading ability, they would have a lot of questions about how much improvement was actually obtained. They would be confused and annoyed at how inconvenient the scores are, because they are difficult, if not impossible, to compare. A lot of time and effort might be invested in examining the words and sentences in each of the four reading tests to try to determine how easy or hard they are in relation to each other. Or, more likely, everyone would throw their hands up and pay as little as they possibly can for outcomes they don’t understand.

Buying Reading Ability (Scenario 2)

In this scenario, we are third graders again, in different schools with different reading teachers. Now, instead of our teachers making up their own tests, our reading abilities are measured at the beginning and the end of the school year using two different standardized tests sold by competing testing companies. You’re in a private suburban school that’s part of an independent schools association. I’m in a public school along with dozens of others in an urban school district.

For each test, our parents received a report in the mail showing our scores. As before, we know how many questions we each answered correctly, and, unlike before, we don’t know which particular questions we got right or wrong. Finally, we don’t know how easy or hard your tests were relative to mine, but we know that the two tests you took were equated, and so were the two I took. That means your tests will show how much reading ability you gained, and so will mine.

We have one new bit of information we didn’t have before, and that’s a percentile score. Now we know that at the beginning of the year, with a percentile ranking of 72, you performed better than 72% of the other private school third graders taking this test, and at the end of the year you performed better than 76% of them. In contrast, I had percentiles of 84 and 89.

The question we have to ask now is if our parents are going to pay for the percentile gain, or for the actual gain in reading ability. You and I each learned more than our peers did on average, since our percentile scores went up, but this would not work out as a satisfactory way to pay teachers. Averages being averages, if you and I learned more and faster, someone else learned less and slower, so that, in the end, it all balances out. Are we to have teachers paying parents when their children learn less, simply redistributing money in a zero sum game?

And so, additional individualized reports are sent to our parents by the testing companies. Your tests are equated with each other, and they measure in a comparable unit that ranges from 120 to 480. You had a starting score of 235 and finished the year with a score of 420, for a gain of 185.

The tests I took are comparable and measure in the same unit, too, but not the same unit as your tests measure in. Scores on my tests range from 400 to 1200. I started the year with a score of 790, and finished at 1080, for a gain of 290.

Now the confusion in the first scenario is overcome, in part. Our parents can see that we each made real gains in reading ability. The difficulty levels of the two tests you took are the same, as are the difficulties of the two tests I took. But our parents still don’t know what to pay the teacher because they can’t tell if you or I learned more. You had lower percentiles and test scores than I did, but you are being compared with what is likely a higher scoring group of suburban and higher socioeconomic status students than the urban group of disadvantaged students I’m compared against. And your scores aren’t comparable with mine, so you might have started and finished with more reading ability than I did, or maybe I had more than you. There isn’t enough information here to tell.

So, again, the information that is provided is insufficient to the task of settling on a reasonable price for the outcomes obtained. Our parents will again be annoyed and confused by the low quality information that makes it impossible to know what to pay the teacher.

Buying Reading Ability (Scenario 3)

In the third scenario, we are still third graders in different schools with different reading teachers. This time our reading abilities are measured by tests that are completely unique. Every student has a test custom tailored to their particular ability. Unlike the tests in the first and second scenarios, however, now all of the tests have been constructed carefully on the basis of extensive data analysis and experimental tests. Different testing companies are providing the service, but they have gone to the trouble to work together to create consensus standards defining the unit of measurement for any and all reading test items.

For each test, our parents received a report in the mail showing our measures. As before, we know how many questions we each answered correctly. Now, though we don’t know which particular questions we got right or wrong, we can see typical items ordered by difficulty lined up in a way that shows us what kind of items we got wrong, and which kind we got right. And now we also know your tests were equated relative to mine, so we can compare how much reading ability you gained relative to how much I gained. Now our parents can confidently determine how much they should pay the teacher, at least in proportion to their children’s relative measures. If our measured gains are equal, the same payment can be made. If one of us obtained more value, then proportionately more should be paid.

In this third scenario, we have a situation directly analogous to buying oranges. You have a measured amount of increased reading ability that is expressed in the same unit as my gain in reading ability, just as the weights of the oranges are comparable. Further, your test items were not identical with mine, and so the difficulties of the items we took surely differed, just as the sizes of the oranges we bought did.

This third scenario could be made yet more efficient by removing the need for creating and maintaining a calibrated item bank, as described by Stenner and Stone (2003) and in the sixth developmental level in a prior blog post here. Also, additional efficiencies could be gained by unifying the interpretation of the reading ability measures, so that progress through high school can be tracked with respect to the reading demands of adult life (Williamson, 2008).

Comparison of the Purchasing Experiences

In contrast with the grocery store experience, paying for increased reading ability in the first scenario is fraught with low quality information that greatly increases the cost of the transactions. The information is of such low quality that, of course, hardly anyone bothers to go to the trouble to try to decipher it. Too much cost is associated with the effort to make it worthwhile. So, no one knows how much gain in reading ability is obtained, or what a unit gain might cost.

When a school district or educational researchers mount studies to try to find out what it costs to improve reading ability in third graders in some standardized unit, they find so much unexplained variation in the costs that they, too, raise more questions than answers.

In grocery stores and other markets, we don’t place the cost of making the value comparison on the consumer or the merchant. Instead, society as a whole picks up the cost by funding the creation and maintenance of consensus standard metrics. Until we take up the task of doing the same thing for intangible assets, we cannot expect human, social, and natural capital markets to obtain the efficiencies we take for granted in markets for tangible assets and property.

References

Cooper, G., & Humphry, S. M. (2010). The ontological distinction between units and entities. Synthese, pp. DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9832-1.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2002, Spring). “The Mystery of Capital” and the human sciences. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 15(4), 854 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt154j.htm].

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2003). Measurement and communities of inquiry. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 17(3), 936-8 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt173.pdf].

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2004, October). Meaning and method in the social sciences. Human Studies: A Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences, 27(4), 429-54.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2005). Daredevil barnstorming to the tipping point: New aspirations for the human sciences. Journal of Applied Measurement, 6(3), 173-9 [http://www.livingcapitalmetrics.com/images/FisherJAM05.pdf].

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2007, Summer). Living capital metrics. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 21(1), 1092-3 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt211.pdf].

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2009a, November). Invariance and traceability for measures of human, social, and natural capital: Theory and application. Measurement, 42(9), 1278-1287.

Fisher, W. P.. Jr. (2009b). NIST Critical national need idea White Paper: Metrological infrastructure for human, social, and natural capital (Tech. Rep., http://www.livingcapitalmetrics.com/images/FisherNISTWhitePaper2.pdf). New Orleans: LivingCapitalMetrics.com.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2011). Bringing human, social, and natural capital to life: Practical consequences and opportunities. Journal of Applied Measurement, 12(1), in press.

NIST. (2009, 20 July). Outputs and outcomes of NIST laboratory research. Available: http://www.nist.gov/director/planning/studies.cfm (Accessed 1 March 2011).

Stenner, A. J., & Stone, M. (2003). Item specification vs. item banking. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 17(3), 929-30 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt173a.htm].

Williamson, G. L. (2008). A text readability continuum for postsecondary readiness. Journal of Advanced Academics, 19(4), 602-632.

Wright, B. D. (1989). Rasch model from counting right answers: Raw scores as sufficient statistics. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 3(2), 62 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt32e.htm].

Wright, B. D. (1992, Summer). Scores are not measures. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 6(1), 208 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt61n.htm].

Wright, B. D. (1993). Thinking with raw scores. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 7(2), 299-300 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt72r.htm].

Wright, B. D. (1999). Common sense for measurement. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 13(3), 704-5  [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt133h.htm].

Creative Commons License
LivingCapitalMetrics Blog by William P. Fisher, Jr., Ph.D. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Based on a work at livingcapitalmetrics.wordpress.com.
Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://www.livingcapitalmetrics.com.

 

One of the ironies of life is that we often overlook the obvious in favor of the obscure. And so one hears of huge resources poured into finding and capitalizing on opportunities that provide infinitesimally small returns, while other opportunities—with equally certain odds of success but far more profitable returns—are completely neglected.

The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) reports returns on investment ranging from 32% to over 400% in 32 metrological improvements made in semiconductors, construction, automation, computers, materials, manufacturing, chemicals, photonics, communications and pharmaceuticals (NIST, 2009). Previous posts in this blog offer more information on the economic value of metrology. The point is that the returns obtained from improvements in the measurement of tangible assets will likely also be achieved in the measurement of intangible assets.

How? With a little bit of imagination, each stage in the development of increasingly meaningful, efficient, and useful measures described in this previous post can be seen as implying a significant return on investment. As those returns are sought, investors will coordinate and align different technologies and resources relative to a roadmap of how these stages are likely to unfold in the future, as described in this previous post. But what would a concrete example of the new value created look like?

The examples I have in mind hinge on the difference between counting and measuring. Counting is a natural and obvious thing to do when we need some indication of how much of something there is. But counting is not measuring (Cooper & Humphry, 2010; Wright, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1999). This is not some minor academic distinction of no practical use or consequence. It is rather the source of the vast majority of the problems we have in comparing outcome and performance measures.

Imagine how things would be if we couldn’t weigh fruit in a grocery store, and all we could do was count pieces. We can tell when eight small oranges possess less overall mass of fruit than four large ones by weighing them; the eight small oranges might weigh .75 kilograms (about 1.6 pounds) while the four large ones come in at 1.0 kilo (2.2 pounds). If oranges were sold by count instead of weight, perceptive traders would buy small oranges and make more money selling them than they could if they bought large ones.

But we can’t currently arrive so easily at the comparisons we need when we’re buying and selling intangible assets, like those produced as the outcomes of educational, health care, or other services. So I want to walk through a couple of very down-to-earth examples to bring the point home. Today we’ll focus on the simplest version of the story, and tomorrow we’ll take up a little more complicated version, dealing with the counts, percentages, and scores used in balanced scorecard and dashboard metrics of various kinds.

What if you score eight on one reading test and I score four on a different reading test? Who has more reading ability? In the same way that we might be able to tell just by looking that eight small oranges are likely to have less actual orange fruit than four big ones, we might also be able to tell just by looking that eight easy (short, common) words can likely be read correctly with less reading ability than four difficult (long, rare) words can be.

So let’s analyze the difference between buying oranges and buying reading ability. We’ll set up three scenarios for buying reading ability. In all three, we’ll imagine we’re comparing how we buy oranges with the way we would have to go about buying reading ability today if teachers were paid for the gains made on the tests they administer at the beginning and end of the school year.

In the first scenario, the teachers make up their own tests. In the second, the teachers each use a different standardized test. In the third, each teacher uses a computer program that draws questions from the same online bank of precalibrated items to construct a unique test custom tailored to each student. Reading ability scenario one is likely the most commonly found in real life. Scenario three is the rarest, but nonetheless describes a situation that has been available to millions of students in the U.S., Australia, and elsewhere for several years. Scenarios one, two and three correspond with developmental levels one, three, and five described in a previous blog entry.

Buying Oranges

When you go into one grocery store and I go into another, we don’t have any oranges with us. When we leave, I have eight and you have four. I have twice as many oranges as you, but yours weigh a kilo, about a third more than mine (.75 kilos).

When we paid for the oranges, the transaction was finished in a few seconds. Neither one of us experienced any confusion, annoyance, or inconvenience in relation to the quality of information we had on the amount of orange fruits we were buying. I did not, however, pay twice as much as you did. In fact, you paid more for yours than I did for mine, in direct proportion to the difference in the measured amounts.

No negotiations were necessary to consummate the transactions, and there was no need for special inquiries about how much orange we were buying. We knew from experience in this and other stores that the prices we paid were comparable with those offered in other times and places. Our information was cheap, as it was printed on the bag of oranges or could be read off a scale, and it was very high quality, as the measures were directly comparable with measures from any other scale in any other store. So, in buying oranges, the impact of information quality on the overall cost of the transaction was so inexpensive as to be negligible.

Buying Reading Ability (Scenario 1)

So now you and I go through third grade as eight year olds. You’re in one school and I’m in another. We have different teachers. Each teacher makes up his or her own reading tests. When we started the school year, we each took a reading test (different ones), and we took another (again, different ones) as we ended the school year.

For each test, your teacher counted up your correct answers and divided by the total number of questions; so did mine. You got 72% correct on the first one, and 94% correct on the last one. I got 83% correct on the first one, and 86% correct on the last one. Your score went up 22%, much more than the 3% mine went up. But did you learn more? It is impossible to tell. What if both of your tests were easier—not just for you or for me but for everyone—than both of mine? What if my second test was a lot harder than my first one? On the other hand, what if your tests were harder than mine? Perhaps you did even better than your scores seem to indicate.

We’ll just exclude from consideration other factors that might come to bear, such as whether your tests were significantly longer or shorter than mine, or if one of us ran out of time and did not answer a lot of questions.

If our parents had to pay the reading teacher at the end of the school year for the gains that were made, how would they tell what they were getting for their money? What if your teacher gave a hard test at the start of the year and an easy one at the end of the year so that you’d have a big gain and your parents would have to pay more? What if my teacher gave an easy test at the start of the year and a hard one at the end, so that a really high price could be put on very small gains? If our parents were to compare their experiences in buying our improved reading ability, they would have a lot of questions about how much improvement was actually obtained. They would be confused and annoyed at how inconvenient the scores are, because they are difficult, if not impossible, to compare. A lot of time and effort might be invested in examining the words and sentences in each of the four reading tests to try to determine how easy or hard they are in relation to each other. Or, more likely, everyone would throw their hands up and pay as little as they possibly can for outcomes they don’t understand.

Buying Reading Ability (Scenario 2)

In this scenario, we are third graders again, in different schools with different reading teachers. Now, instead of our teachers making up their own tests, our reading abilities are measured at the beginning and the end of the school year using two different standardized tests sold by competing testing companies. You’re in a private suburban school that’s part of an independent schools association. I’m in a public school along with dozens of others in an urban school district.

For each test, our parents received a report in the mail showing our scores. As before, we know how many questions we each answered correctly, and, as before, we don’t know which particular questions we got right or wrong. Finally, we don’t know how easy or hard your tests were relative to mine, but we know that the two tests you took were equated, and so were the two I took. That means your tests will show how much reading ability you gained, and so will mine.

But we have one new bit of information we didn’t have before, and that’s a percentile score. Now we know that at the beginning of the year, with a percentile ranking of 72, you performed better than 72% of the other private school third graders taking this test, and at the end of the year you performed better than 76% of them. In contrast, I had percentiles of 84 and 89.

The question we have to ask now is if our parents are going to pay for the percentile gain, or for the actual gain in reading ability. You and I each learned more than our peers did on average, since our percentile scores went up, but this would not work out as a satisfactory way to pay teachers. Averages being averages, if you and I learned more and faster, someone else learned less and slower, so that, in the end, it all balances out. Are we to have teachers paying parents when their children learn less, simply redistributing money in a zero sum game?

And so, additional individualized reports are sent to our parents by the testing companies. Your tests are equated with each other, so they measure in a comparable unit that ranges from 120 to 480. You had a starting score of 235 and finished the year with a score of 420, for a gain of 185.

The tests I took are comparable and measure in the same unit, too, but not the same unit as your tests measure in. Scores on my tests range from 400 to 1200. I started the year with a score of 790, and finished at 1080, for a gain of 290.

Now the confusion in the first scenario is overcome, in part. Our parents can see that we each made real gains in reading ability. The difficulty levels of the two tests you took are the same, as are the difficulties of the two tests I took. But our parents still don’t know what to pay the teacher because they can’t tell if you or I learned more. You had lower percentiles and test scores than I did, but you are being compared with what is likely a higher scoring group of suburban and higher socioeconomic status students than the urban group of disadvantaged students I’m compared against. And your scores aren’t comparable with mine, so you might have started and finished with more reading ability than I did, or maybe I had more than you. There isn’t enough information here to tell.

So, again, the information that is provided is insufficient to the task of settling on a reasonable price for the outcomes obtained. Our parents will again be annoyed and confused by the low quality information that makes it impossible to know what to pay the teacher.

Buying Reading Ability (Scenario 3)

In the third scenario, we are still third graders in different schools with different reading teachers. This time our reading abilities are measured by tests that are completely unique. Every student has a test custom tailored to their particular ability. Unlike the tests in the first and second scenarios, however, now all of the tests have been constructed carefully on the basis of extensive data analysis and experimental tests. Different testing companies are providing the service, but they have gone to the trouble to work together to create consensus standards defining the unit of measurement for any and all reading test items.

For each test, our parents received a report in the mail showing our measures. As before, we know how many questions we each answered correctly. Now, though we don’t know which particular questions we got right or wrong, we can see typical items ordered by difficulty lined up in a way that shows us what kind of items we got wrong, and which kind we got right. And now we also know your tests were equated relative to mine, so we can compare how much reading ability you gained relative to how much I gained. Now our parents can confidently determine how much they should pay the teacher, at least in proportion to their children’s relative measures. If our measured gains are equal, the same payment can be made. If one of us obtained more value, then proportionately more should be paid.

In this third scenario, we have a situation directly analogous to buying oranges. You have a measured amount of increased reading ability that is expressed in the same unit as my gain in reading ability, just as the weights of the oranges are comparable. Further, your test items were not identical with mine, and so the difficulties of the items we took surely differed, just as the sizes of the oranges we bought did.

This third scenario could be made yet more efficient by removing the need for creating and maintaining a calibrated item bank, as described by Stenner and Stone (2003) and in the sixth developmental level in a prior blog post here. Also, additional efficiencies could be gained by unifying the interpretation of the reading ability measures, so that progress through high school can be tracked with respect to the reading demands of adult life (Williamson, 2008).

Comparison of the Purchasing Experiences

In contrast with the grocery store experience, paying for increased reading ability in the first scenario is fraught with low quality information that greatly increases the cost of the transactions. The information is of such low quality that, of course, hardly anyone bothers to go to the trouble to try to decipher it. Too much cost is associated with the effort to make it worthwhile. So, no one knows how much gain in reading ability is obtained, or what a unit gain might cost.

When a school district or educational researchers mount studies to try to find out what it costs to improve reading ability in third graders in some standardized unit, they find so much unexplained variation in the costs that they, too, raise more questions than answers.

But we don’t place the cost of making the value comparison on the consumer or the merchant in the grocery store. Instead, society as a whole picks up the cost by funding the creation and maintenance of consensus standard metrics. Until we take up the task of doing the same thing for intangible assets, we cannot expect human, social, and natural capital markets to obtain the efficiencies we take for granted in markets for tangible assets and property.

References

Cooper, G., & Humphry, S. M. (2010). The ontological distinction between units and entities. Synthese, pp. DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9832-1.

NIST. (2009, 20 July). Outputs and outcomes of NIST laboratory research. Available: http://www.nist.gov/director/planning/studies.cfm (Accessed 1 March 2011).

Stenner, A. J., & Stone, M. (2003). Item specification vs. item banking. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 17(3), 929-30 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt173a.htm].

Williamson, G. L. (2008). A text readability continuum for postsecondary readiness. Journal of Advanced Academics, 19(4), 602-632.

Wright, B. D. (1989). Rasch model from counting right answers: Raw scores as sufficient statistics. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 3(2), 62 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt32e.htm].

Wright, B. D. (1992, Summer). Scores are not measures. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 6(1), 208 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt61n.htm].

Wright, B. D. (1993). Thinking with raw scores. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 7(2), 299-300 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt72r.htm].

Wright, B. D. (1999). Common sense for measurement. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 13(3), 704-5  [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt133h.htm].

Measurement, Metrology, and the Birth of Self-Organizing, Complex Adaptive Systems

February 28, 2011

On page 145 of his book, The Mathematics of Measurement: A Critical History, John Roche quotes Charles de La Condamine (1701-1774), who, in 1747, wrote:

‘It is quite evident that the diversity of weights and measures of different countries, and frequently in the same province, are a source of embarrassment in commerce, in the study of physics, in history, and even in politics itself; the unknown names of foreign measures, the laziness or difficulty in relating them to our own give rise to confusion in our ideas and leave us in ignorance of facts which could be useful to us.’

Roche (1998, p. 145) then explains what de La Condamine is driving at, saying:

“For reasons of international communication and of civic justice, for reasons of stability over time and for accuracy and reliability, the creation of exact, reproducible and well maintained international standards, especially of length and mass, became an increasing concern of the natural philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This movement, cooperating with a corresponding impulse in governing circles for the reform of weights and measures for the benefit of society and trade, culminated in late eighteenth century France in the metric system. It established not only an exact, rational and international system of measuring length, area, volume and mass, but introduced a similar standard for temperature within the scientific community. It stimulated a wider concern within science to establish all scientific units with equal rigour, basing them wherever possible on the newly established metric units (and on the older exact units of time and angular measurement), because of their accuracy, stability and international availability. This process gradually brought about a profound change in the notation and interpretation of the mathematical formalism of physics: it brought about, for the first time in the history of the mathematical sciences, a true union of mathematics and measurement.”

As it was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for physics, so it has also been in the twentieth and twenty-first for the psychosocial sciences. The creation of exact, reproducible and well maintained international standards is a matter of increasing concern today for the roles they will play in education, health care, the work place, business intelligence, and the economy at large.

As the economic crises persist and perhaps worsen, demand for common product definitions and for interpretable, meaningful measures of impacts and outcomes in education, health care, social services, environmental management, etc. will reach a crescendo. We need an exact, rational and international system of measuring literacy, numeracy, health, motivations, quality of life, community cohesion, and environmental quality, and we needed it fifty years ago. We need to reinvigorate and revive a wider concern across the sciences to establish all scientific units with equal rigor, and to have all measures used in research and practice based wherever possible on consensus standard metrics valued for their accuracy, stability and availability. We need to replicate in the psychosocial sciences the profound change in the notation and interpretation of the mathematical formalism of physics that occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We need to extend the true union of mathematics and measurement from physics to the psychosocial sciences.

Previous posts in this blog speak to the persistent invariance and objectivity exhibited by many of the constructs measured using ability tests, attitude surveys, performance assessments, etc. A question previously raised in this blog concerning the reproductive logic of living meaning deserves more attention, and can be productively explored in terms of complex adaptive functionality.

In a hierarchy of reasons why mathematically rigorous measurement is valuable, few are closer to the top of the list than facilitating the spontaneous self-organization of networks of agents and actors (Latour, 1987). The conception, gestation, birthing, and nurturing of complex adaptive systems constitute a reproductive logic for sociocultural traditions. Scientific traditions, in particular, form mature self-identities via a mutually implied subject-object relation absorbed into the flow of a dialectical give and take, just as economic systems do.

Complex adaptive systems establish the reproductive viability of their offspring and the coherence of an ecological web of meaningful relationships by means of this dialectic. Taylor (2003, pp. 166-8) describes the five moments in the formation and operation of complex adaptive systems, which must be able

  • to identify regularities and patterns in the flow of matter, energy, and information (MEI) in the environment (business, social, economic, natural, etc.);
  • to produce condensed schematic representations of these regularities so they can be identified as the same if they are repeated;
  • to form reproductively interchangeable variants of these representations;
  • to succeed reproductively by means of the accuracy and reliability of the representations’ predictions of regularities in the MEI data flow; and
  • adaptively modify and reorganize representations by means of informational feedback from the environment.

All living systems, from bacteria and viruses to plants and animals to languages and cultures, are complex adaptive systems characterized by these five features.

In the history of science, technologically-embodied measurement facilitates complex adaptive systems of various kinds. That history can be used as a basis for a meta-theoretical perspective on what measurement must look like in the social and human sciences. Each of Taylor’s five moments in the formation and operation of complex adaptive systems describes a capacity of measurement systems, in that:

  • data flow regularities are captured in initial, provisional instrument calibrations;
  • condensed local schematic representations are formed when an instrument’s calibrations are anchored at repeatedly observed, invariant values;
  • interchangeable nonlocal versions of these invariances are created by means of instrument equating, item banking, metrological networks, and selective, tailored, adaptive instrument administration;
  • measures read off inaccurate and unreliable instruments will not support successful reproduction of the data flow regularity, but accurate and reliable instruments calibrated in a shared common unit provide a reference standard metric that enhances communication and reproduces the common voice and shared identity of the research community; and
  • consistently inconsistent anomalous observations provide feedback suggesting new possibilities for as yet unrecognized data flow regularities that might be captured in new calibrations.

Measurement in the social sciences is in the process of extending this functionality into practical applications in business, education, health care, government, and elsewhere. Over the course of the last 50 years, measurement research and practice has already iterated many times through these five moments. In the coming years, a new critical mass will be reached in this process, systematically bringing about scale-of-magnitude improvements in the efficiency of intangible assets markets.

How? What does a “data flow regularity” look like? How is it condensed into a a schematic and used to calibrate an instrument? How are local schematics combined together in a pattern used to recognize new instances of themselves? More specifically, how might enterprise resource planning (ERP) software (such as SAP, Oracle, or PeopleSoft) simultaneously provide both the structure needed to support meaningful comparisons and the flexibility needed for good fit with the dynamic complexity of adaptive and generative self-organizing systems?

Prior work in this area proposes a dual-core, loosely coupled organization using ERP software to build social and intellectual capital, instead of using it as an IT solution addressing organizational inefficiencies (Lengnick-Hall, Lengnick-Hall, & Abdinnour-Helm, 2004). The adaptive and generative functionality (Stenner & Stone, 2003) provided by probabilistic measurement models (Rasch, 1960; Andrich, 2002, 2004; Bond & Fox, 2007; Wilson, 2005; Wright, 1977, 1999) makes it possible to model intra- and inter-organizational interoperability (Weichhart, Feiner, & Stary, 2010) at the same time that social and intellectual capital resources are augmented.

Actor/agent network theory has emerged from social and historical studies of the shared and competing moral, economic, political, and mathematical values disseminated by scientists and technicians in a variety of different successful and failed areas of research (Latour, 2005). The resulting sociohistorical descriptions ought be translated into a practical program for reproducing successful research programs. A metasystem for complex adaptive systems of research is implied in what Roche (1998) calls a “true union of mathematics and measurement.”

Complex adaptive systems are effectively constituted of such a union, even if, in nature, the mathematical character of the data flows and calibrations remains virtual. Probabilistic conjoint models for fundamental measurement are poised to extend this functionality into the human sciences. Though few, if any, have framed the situation in these terms, these and other questions are being explored, explicitly and implicitly, by hundreds of researchers in dozens of fields as they employ unidimensional models for measurement in their investigations.

If so, might then we be on the verge of a yet another new reading and writing of Galileo’s “book of nature,” this time restoring the “loss of meaning for life” suffered in Galileo’s “fateful omission” of the means by which nature came to be understood mathematically (Husserl, 1970)? The elements of a comprehensive, mathematical, and experimental design science of living systems appear on the verge of providing a saturated solution—or better, a nonequilbrium thermodynamic solution—to some of the infamous shortcomings of modern, Enlightenment science. The unity of science may yet be a reality, though not via the reductionist program envisioned by the positivists.

Some 50 years ago, Marshall McLuhan popularized the expression, “The medium is the message.” The special value quantitative measurement in the history of science does not stem from the mere use of number. Instruments are media on which nature, human or other, inscribes legible messages. A renewal of the true union of mathematics and measurement in the context of intangible assets will lead to a new cultural, scientific, and economic renaissance. As Thomas Kuhn (1977, p. 221) wrote,

“The full and intimate quantification of any science is a consummation devoutly to be wished. Nevertheless, it is not a consummation that can effectively be sought by measuring. As in individual development, so in the scientific group, maturity comes most surely to those who know how to wait.”

Given that we have strong indications of how full and intimate quantification consummates a true union of mathematics and measurement, the time for waiting is now past, and the time to act has come. See prior blog posts here for suggestions on an Intangible Assets Metric System, for resources on methods and research, for other philosophical ruminations, and more. This post is based on work presented at Rasch meetings several years ago (Fisher, 2006a, 2006b).

References

Andrich, D. (2002). Understanding resistance to the data-model relationship in Rasch’s paradigm: A reflection for the next generation. Journal of Applied Measurement, 3(3), 325-59.

Andrich, D. (2004, January). Controversy and the Rasch model: A characteristic of incompatible paradigms? Medical Care, 42(1), I-7–I-16.

Bond, T., & Fox, C. (2007). Applying the Rasch model: Fundamental measurement in the human sciences, 2d edition. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2006a, Friday, April 28). Complex adaptive functionality via measurement. Presented at the Midwest Objective Measurement Seminar, M. Lunz (Organizer), University of Illinois at Chicago.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2006b, June 27-9). Measurement and complex adaptive functionality. Presented at the Pacific Rim Objective Measurement Symposium, T. Bond & M. Wu (Organizers), The Hong Kong Institute of Education, Hong Kong.

Husserl, E. (1970). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology: An introduction to phenomenological philosophy (D. Carr, Trans.). Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press (Original work published 1954).

Kuhn, T. S. (1977). The function of measurement in modern physical science. In T. S. Kuhn, The essential tension: Selected studies in scientific tradition and change (pp. 178-224). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [(Reprinted from Kuhn, T. S. (1961). Isis, 52(168), 161-193.]

Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory. (Clarendon Lectures in Management Studies). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Lengnick-Hall, C. A., Lengnick-Hall, M. L., & Abdinnour-Helm, S. (2004). The role of social and intellectual capital in achieving competitive advantage through enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems. Journal of Engineering Technology Management, 21, 307-330.

Rasch, G. (1960). Probabilistic models for some intelligence and attainment tests (Reprint, with Foreword and Afterword by B. D. Wright, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Copenhagen, Denmark: Danmarks Paedogogiske Institut.

Roche, J. (1998). The mathematics of measurement: A critical history. London: The Athlone Press.

Stenner, A. J., & Stone, M. (2003). Item specification vs. item banking. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 17(3), 929-30 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt173a.htm].

Taylor, M. C. (2003). The moment of complexity: Emerging network culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Weichhart, G., Feiner, T., & Stary, C. (2010). Implementing organisational interoperability–The SUddEN approach. Computers in Industry, 61, 152-160.

Wilson, M. (2005). Constructing measures: An item response modeling approach. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Wright, B. D. (1977). Solving measurement problems with the Rasch model. Journal of Educational Measurement, 14(2), 97-116 [http://www.rasch.org/memo42.htm].

Wright, B. D. (1997, Winter). A history of social science measurement. Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, 16(4), 33-45, 52 [http://www.rasch.org/memo62.htm].

Wright, B. D. (1999). Fundamental measurement for psychology. In S. E. Embretson & S. L. Hershberger (Eds.), The new rules of measurement: What every educator and psychologist should know (pp. 65-104 [http://www.rasch.org/memo64.htm]). Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Creative Commons License
LivingCapitalMetrics Blog by William P. Fisher, Jr., Ph.D. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Based on a work at livingcapitalmetrics.wordpress.com.
Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://www.livingcapitalmetrics.com.