Posts Tagged ‘distributed cognition’

Revisiting the “Glocal” integration of universals and historical context

April 11, 2014

Integrated considerations of the universal and the local, the pure ideal parameters and the messy concrete observations, seem ever more ubiquitous in my reading lately. For instance, Ricoeur (1992, p. 289) takes up the problem of human rights imperfectly realized as a product of Western Europe’s cultural history that has nonetheless been adopted by nearly every country in the world. Ricoeur raises the notion of “universals in context or of potential or inchoate universals” that embody the paradox in which

“on the one hand, one must maintain the universal claim attached to a few values where the universal and the historical intersect, and on the other hand, one must submit this claim to discussion, not on a formal level, but on the level of the convictions incorporated in concrete forms of life.”

I could hardly come up with a better description of Rasch measurement theory and practice myself. Any given Rasch model data analysis provides many times more individual-level qualitative statistics on the concrete, substantive observations than on the global quantitative measures. The whole point of graphical displays of measurement information in kidmaps (Chien, Wang, Wang, & Lin, 2009; Masters, 1994), Wright maps (Wilson, 2011), construct maps and self-scoring forms (Best, 2008; Linacre, 1997), etc. is precisely to integrate concrete events as they happened with the abstract ideal of a shared measurement dimension.

It is such a shame that there are so few people thinking about these issues aware of the practical value of the state of the art in measurement, and who include all of the various implications of multifaceted, multilevel, and multi-uni-dimensional modeling, fit assessment, equating, construct mapping, standard setting, etc. in their critiques.

The problem falls squarely in the domain of recent work on the coproduction of social, scientific, and economic orders (such as Hutchins 2010, 2012; Nersessian, 2012). Systems of standards, from languages to metric units to dollars, prethink the world for us and simplify a lot of complex work. But then we’re stuck at the level of conceptual, social, economic, and scientific complexity implied by those standards, unless we can create new forms of social organization integrating more domains. Those who don’t know anything about the available tools can’t get any analytic traction, those who know about the tools but don’t connect with the practitioners can’t get any applied traction (see Wilson’s Psychometric Society Presidential Address on this; Wilson, 2013), analysts and practitioners who form alliances but fail to include accountants or administrators may lack financial or organizational traction, etc. etc.

There’s a real need to focus on the formation of alliances across domains of practice, building out the implications of Callon’s (1995, p. 58) observation that “”translation networks weave a socionature.” In other words, standards are translated into the languages of different levels and kinds of practice to the extent that people become so thoroughly habituated to them that they succumb to the illusion that the objects of interest are inherently natural in self-evident ways. (My 2014 IOMW talk took this up, though there wasn’t a lot of time for details.)

Those who are studying these networks have come to important insights that set the stage for better measurement and metrology for human, social, and natural capital. For instance, in a study of universalities in medicine, Berg and Timmermans (2000, pp. 55, 56) note:

“In order for a statistical logistics to enhance precise decision making, it has to incorporate imprecision; in order to be universal, it has to carefully select its locales. The parasite cannot be killed off slowly by gradually increasing the scope of the Order. Rather, an Order can thrive only when it nourishes its parasite—so that it can be nourished by it.”

“Paradoxically, then, the increased stability and reach of this network was not due to more (precise) instructions: the protocol’s logistics could thrive only by parasitically drawing upon its own disorder.”

Though Berg and Timmermans show no awareness at all of probabilistic and additive conjoint measurement theory and practice, their description of how a statistical logistics has to work to enhance precise decision making is right on target. This phenomenon of noise-induced order is a kind of social stochastic resonance (Fisher, 1992, 2011b) that provides another direction in which explanations of Rasch measurement’s potential role in establishing new metrological standards (Fisher, 2009, 2011a) have to be taken.

Berg, M., & Timmermans, S. (2000). Order and their others: On the constitution of universalities in medical work. Configurations, 8(1), 31-61.

Best, W. R. (2008). A construct map that Ben Wright would relish. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 22(3), 1169-70 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt223a.htm].

Callon, M. (1995). Four models for the dynamics of science. In S. Jasanoff, G. E. Markle, J. C. Petersen & T. Pinch (Eds.), Handbook of science and technology studies (pp. 29-63). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Chien, T.-W., Wang, W.-C., Wang, H.-Y., & Lin, H.-J. (2009). Online assessment of patients’ views on hospital performances using Rasch model’s KIDMAP diagram. BMC Health Services Research, 9, 135 [10.1186/1472-6963-9-135 or http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2727503/%5D.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (1992, Spring). Stochastic resonance and Rasch measurement. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 5(4), 186-187 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt54k.htm].

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2009, November). Invariance and traceability for measures of human, social, and natural capital: Theory and application. Measurement, 42(9), 1278-1287.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2011a). Bringing human, social, and natural capital to life: Practical consequences and opportunities. In N. Brown, B. Duckor, K. Draney & M. Wilson (Eds.), Advances in Rasch Measurement, Vol. 2 (pp. 1-27). Maple Grove, MN: JAM Press.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2011b). Stochastic and historical resonances of the unit in physics and psychometrics. Measurement: Interdisciplinary Research & Perspectives, 9, 46-50.

Hutchins, E. (2010). Cognitive ecology. Topics in Cognitive Science, 2, 705-715.

Hutchins, E. (2012). Concepts in practice as sources of order. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 19, 314-323.

Linacre, J. M. (1997). Instantaneous measurement and diagnosis. Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation State of the Art Reviews, 11(2), 315-324 [http://www.rasch.org/memo60.htm].

Masters, G. N. (1994). KIDMAP – a history. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 8(2), 366 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt82k.htm].

Nersessian, N. J. (2012). Engineering concepts: The interplay between concept formation and modeling practices in bioengineering sciences. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 19, 222-239.

Wilson, M. R. (2011). Some notes on the term: “Wright Map.” Rasch Measurement Transactions, 25(3), 1331 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt253.pdf].

Wilson, M. (2013, April). Seeking a balance between the statistical and scientific elements in psychometrics. Psychometrika, 78(2), 211-236.

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How to Trade “Global Mush” for Beauty, Meaning, and Value: Reflections on Lanier’s New Book

January 15, 2010

Implicit in many of my recent posts here is the idea that we must learn how to follow through on the appropriation of meaning to proper ownership of the properties characteristic of our own proprietary capital resources: the creativities, abilities, skills, talents, health, motivations, trust, etc.  that make us each reliable citizens and neighbors, and economically viable in being hireable, promotable, productive, and retainable. Individual control of investment in, income from, and returns on our own shares of human, social, and natural capital ought to be a fundamental constitutional human right.

But, just as property rights are constitutionally guaranteed by nations around the world that don’t take the trouble to enforce them or even to provide their necessary infrastructural capacities, so, too, are human rights to equal opportunities widely guaranteed without being properly provided for or enforced. And now in the Internet age, we have succeeded in innovating ever more fluid media for the expression of our individual capacities for making original cultural, technical, and human contributions, but we have yet to figure out how to exert effective control over the returns and income generated by these contributions.

Jaron Lanier’s new book, “You Are Not a Gadget,” is taking up this theme in interesting ways. In his recent Wall Street Journal article, Lanier says:

“There’s a dominant dogma in the online culture of the moment that collectives make the best stuff, but it hasn’t proven to be true. The most sophisticated, influential and lucrative examples of computer code—like the page-rank algorithms in the top search engines or Adobe’s Flash— always turn out to be the results of proprietary development. Indeed, the adored iPhone came out of what many regard as the most closed, tyrannically managed software-development shop on Earth.

Actually, Silicon Valley is remarkably good at not making collectivization mistakes when our own fortunes are at stake. On the one hand we want to avoid physical work and instead benefit from intellectual property. On the other hand, we’re undermining intellectual property so that information can roam around for nothing, or more precisely as bait for advertisements. That’s a formula that leaves no way for our nation to earn a living in the long term.
The “open” paradigm rests on the assumption that the way to get ahead is to give away your brain’s work—your music, writing, computer code and so on—and earn kudos instead of money. You are then supposedly compensated because your occasional dollop of online recognition will help you get some kind of less cerebral work that can earn money. For instance, maybe you can sell custom branded T-shirts.
We’re well over a decade into this utopia of demonetized sharing and almost everyone who does the kind of work that has been collectivized online is getting poorer. There are only a tiny handful of writers or musicians who actually make a living in the new utopia, for instance. Almost everyone else is becoming more like a peasant every day.”
Lanier’s suggestions of revised software structures and micropayment systems in an extension of intellectual property rights correctly recognizes the scope of the challenges we face. He also describes the motivations driving the ongoing collectivization process, saying that “youthful fascination with collectivism is in part simply a way to address perceived ‘unfairness’.” This radical way of enforcing a very low lowest common denominator points straight at the essential problem, and that problem is apparent in the repeated use of the key word, collective.

It was not so long ago that it was impossible to use that word without immediately evoking images of Soviet central planning and committees. The “global mush” of mediocrity Lanier complains about as a direct result of collective thinking is a very good way of describing the failures of socialism that brought down the Soviet Union by undercutting its economic viability. Lanier speaks of growing up and enthusiastically participating various forms of collective life, like food co-ops and shared housing. I, too, have shared those experiences. I saw, as Lanier sees and as the members of communes in the U.S. during the 1960s saw, that nothing gets done when no one owns the process and stands to reap the rewards: when housekeeping is everyone’s responsibility, no one does it.

Further and more to the point, nothing goes right when supply and demand are dictated by a central committee driven by ideological assumptions concerning exactly what does and does not constitute the greater good.  On the contrary, innovation is stifled, inefficiencies are rampant, and no one takes the initiative to do better because there are no incentives for doing so. Though considerable pain is experienced in allowing the invisible hand to coordinate the flux and flows of markets, no better path to prosperity has yet been found. The current struggle is less one of figuring out how to do without markets than it is one of figuring out how to organize them for greater long term stability. As previous posts in this blog endeavor to show, we ought to be looking more toward bringing all forms of capital into the market instead of toward regulating some to death while others ravage the economy, scot-free.

Friedrich von Hayek (1988, 1994) is an economist and philosopher often noted for his on-target evaluations of the errors of socialism. He tellingly focused on the difference between the laborious micromanagement of socialism’s thought police and the wealth-creating liberation of capital’s capacity for self-organization. It is interesting that Lanier describes the effects of demonetized online sharing as driving most of us toward peasant status, as Hayek (1994) describes socialism as a “road to serfdom.” Of course, capitalism itself is far from perfect, since private property, and manufactured and liquid capital, have enjoyed a freedom of movement that too often recklessly tramples human rights, community life, and the natural environment. But as is described in a previous blog I posted on re-inventing capitalism, we can go a long way toward rectifying the errors of capitalism by setting up the rules of law that will lubricate and improve the efficiency of human, social, and natural capital markets.

Now, I’ve always been fascinated with the Latin root shared in words like property, propriety, proprietary, appropriation, proper, and the French propre (which means both clean and one’s own, or belonging to oneself, depending on whether it comes before or after the noun; une maison propre = a clean house and sa propre maison = his/her own house). I was then happy to encounter in graduate school Ricoeur’s (1981) theory of text interpretation, which focuses on the way we create meaning by appropriating it. Real understanding requires that we must make a text our own if we are to be able to give proper evidence of understanding it by restating or summarizing it in our own words.

Such restating is, of course, also the criterion for demonstrating that a scientific theory of the properties of a phenomenon is adequate to the task of reproducing its effects on demand. As Ricoeur (1981, p. 210) says, situating science in a sphere of signs puts the human and natural sciences together on the same footing in the context of linguistically-mediated social relations. This unification of the sciences has profound consequences, not just for philosophy, the social sciences, or economics, but for the practical task of transforming the current “global mush” into a beautiful, meaningful, and effective living creativity system. So, there is real practical significance in realizing what appropriation is and how its processes feed into our conceptualizations of property, propriety, and ownership.

When we can devise a new instrument or measuring method that gives the same results as an existing instrument or method, we have demonstrated theoretical control over the properties of the phenomenon (Heelan, 1983, 2001; Ihde, 1991; Ihde & Selinger, 2003; Fisher, 2004, 2006, 2010b). The more precisely the effects are reproduced, the purer they become, the clearer their representation, and the greater their independence from the local contingencies of sample, instrument, observer, method, etc. When we can package a technique for reproducing the desired effects (radio or tv broadcast/reception, vibrating toothbrushes, or what have you), we can export the phenomenon from the laboratory via networks of distribution, supply, sales, marketing, manufacture, repair, etc. (Latour, 1987). Proprietary methods, instruments, and effects can then be patented and ownership secured.

What we have in the current “global mush” of collective aggregations are nothing at all of this kind. There are specific criteria for information quality and network configuration (Akkerman, et al., 2007; Latour, 1987, pp. 247-257; Latour, 1995; Magnus, 2007; Mandel, 1978; Wise, 1995) that have to be met for collective cognition to realize its potential in the manner described by Surowiecki (2004) or Brafman and Beckstrom (2006), for instance.  The difference is the difference between living and dead capital, between capitalism and socialism, and between scientific measurement and funny numbers that don’t stand for the repetitive additivity of a constant unit (Fisher, 2002, 2009, 2010a). As Lanier notes, Silicon Valley understands very well the nature of this difference, and protects its own interests by vigilantly ensuring that its collective cognitions are based in properly constructed information and networks.

And here we find the crux of the lesson to be learned. We need to focus very carefully on the details of how we create meaningful relationships, of how things come into words, of how instruments are calibrated and linked together in shared systems of signification, and of how economies thrive on the productive efficiencies of well-lubricated markets. Everything we need to turn things around is available, though seeing things for what they are is one of the most daunting and difficult tasks we can undertake.

The postmodern implications of the way appropriation is more a letting-go than a possessing (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 191) will be taken up another time, in the context of the playful flow of signification we are always already caught up within. For now, it is enough to point the way toward the issues raised and examined in other posts in this blog as to how capital is brought to life. We are well on the way toward a convergence of efforts that may well result in exactly the kind of fierce individuals and competing teams able to reap their just due, as Lanier envisions.

References

Akkerman, S., Van den Bossche, P., Admiraal, W., Gijselaers, W., Segers, M., Simons, R.-J., Kirschnerd, P. (2007, February). Reconsidering group cognition: From conceptual confusion to a boundary area between cognitive and socio-cultural perspectives? Educational Research Review, 2, 39-63.
Brafman, O., & Beckstrom, R. A. (2006). The starfish and the spider: The unstoppable power of leaderless organizations. New York: Portfolio (Penguin Group).

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2002, Spring). “The Mystery of Capital” and the human sciences. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 15(4), 854 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt154j.htm].

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2004, October). Meaning and method in the social sciences. Human Studies: A Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences, 27(4), 429-54.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2006). Meaningfulness, sufficiency, invariance, and conjoint additivity. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 20(1), 1053 [http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt201.htm].

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2009, November). Invariance and traceability for measures of human, social, and natural capital: Theory and application. Measurement (Elsevier), 42(9), 1278-1287.

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2010a). Bringing human, social, and natural capital to life: Practical consequences and opportunities. Journal of Applied Measurement, 11, in press [http://www.livingcapitalmetrics.com/images/BringingHSN_FisherARMII.pdf].

Fisher, W. P., Jr. (2010)b. Reducible or irreducible? Mathematical reasoning and the ontological method. Journal of Applied Measurement, 11, in press.

von Hayek, F. A. (1988). The fatal conceit: The errors of socialism (W. W. Bartley, III, Ed.) (Vol. I). The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

von Hayek, F. A. (1994/1944). The road to serfdom (Fiftieth Anniversary Edition; Introduction by Milton Friedman). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Heelan, P. A. (1983, June). Natural science as a hermeneutic of instrumentation. Philosophy of Science, 50, 181-204.

Heelan, P. A. (2001). The lifeworld and scientific interpretation. In S. K. Toombs (Ed.), Handbook of phenomenology and medicine (pp. 47-66). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ihde, D., & Selinger, E. (Eds.). (2003). Chasing technoscience: Matrix for materiality. (Indiana Series in Philosophy of Technology). Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Latour, B. (1995). Cogito ergo sumus! Or psychology swept inside out by the fresh air of the upper deck: Review of Hutchins’ Cognition in the Wild, MIT Press, 1995. Mind, Culture, and Activity: An International Journal, 3(192), 54-63.

Magnus, P. D. (2007). Distributed cognition and the task of science. Social Studies of Science, 37(2), 297-310.

Mandel, J. (1978, December). Interlaboratory testing. ASTM Standardization News, 6, 11-12.

Ricoeur, P. (1981). Hermeneutics and the human sciences: Essays on language, action and interpretation (J. B. Thompson, Ed. & Trans). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Surowiecki, J. (2004). The wisdom of crowds: Why the many are smarter than the few and how collective wisdom shapes business, economies, societies and nations. New York: Doubleday.
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LivingCapitalMetrics Blog by William P. Fisher, Jr., Ph.D. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
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Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://www.livingcapitalmetrics.com.

Contrasting Network Communities: Transparent, Efficient, and Invested vs Not

November 30, 2009

Different networks and different communities have different amounts of social capital going for them. As was originally described by Putnam (1993), some networks are organized hierarchically in a command-and-control structure. The top layers here are the autocrats, nobility, or bosses who run the show. Rigid conformity is the name of the game to get by. Those in power can make or break anyone. Market transactions in this context are characterized by the thumb on the scale, the bribe, and the kickback. Everyone is watching out for themselves.

At the opposite extreme are horizontal networks characterized by altruism and a sense that doing what’s good for everyone will eventually come back around to be good for me. The ideal here is a republic in which the law rules and everyone has the same price of entry into the market.

What I’d like to focus on is what’s going on in these horizontal networks. What makes one a more tightly-knit community than another? The closeness people feel should not be oppressive or claustrophic or smothering. I’m thinking of community relations in which people feel safe, not just personally but creatively. How and when are diversity, dissent and innovation not just tolerated but celebrated? What makes it possible for a market in new ideas and new ways of doing things to take off?

And how does a community like this differ from another one that is just as horizontally structured but that does not give rise to anything at all creative?

The answers to all of these questions seem to me to hinge on the transparency, efficiency, and volume of investments in the relationships making up the networks. What kinds of investments? All kinds: emotional, social, intellectual, financial, spiritual, etc. Less transparent, inefficient, and low volume investments don’t have the thickness or complexity of the relationships that we can see through, that are well lubricated, and that are reinforced with frequent visits.

Putnam (1993, p. 183) has a very illuminating way of putting this: “The harmonies of a choral society illustrate how voluntary collaboration can create value that no individual, no matter how wealthy, no matter how wily, could produce alone.” Social capital is the coordination of thought and behavior that embodies trust, good will, and loyalty. Social capital is at play when an individual can rely on a thickly elaborated network of largely unknown others who provide clean water, nutritious food, effective public health practices (sanitation, restaurant inspections, and sewers), fire and police protection, a fair and just judiciary, electrical and information technology, affordably priced consumer goods, medical care, and who ensure the future by educating the next generation.

Life would be incredibly difficult if we could not trust others to obey traffic laws, or to do their jobs without taking unfair advantage of access to special knowledge (credit card numbers, cash, inside information), etc. But beyond that, we gain huge efficiencies in our lives because of the way our thoughts and behaviors are harmonized and coordinated on mass scales. We just simply do not have to worry about millions of things that are being taken care of, things that would completely freeze us in our tracks if they weren’t being done.

Thus, later on the same page, Putnam also observes that, “For political stability, for government effectiveness, and even for economic progress social capital may be even more important than physical or human capital.” And so, he says, “Where norms and networks of civic engagement are lacking, the outlook for collective action appears bleak.”

But what if two communities have identical norms and networks, but they differ in one crucial way: one relies on everyday language, used in conversations and written messages, to get things done, and the other has a new language, one with a heightened capacity for transparent meaningfulness and precision efficiency? Which one is likely to be more creative and innovative?

The question can be re-expressed in terms of Gladwell’s (2000) sense of the factors contributing to reaching a tipping point: the mavens, connectors, salespeople, and the stickiness of the messages. What if the mavens in two communities are equally knowledgeable, the connectors just as interconnected, and the salespeople just as persuasive, but messages are dramatically less sticky in one community than the other? In one network of networks, saying things once gets the right response 99% of the time, but in the other things have to be repeated seven times before the right response comes back even 50% of the time, and hardly anyone makes the effort to repeat things that many times. Guess which community will be safer, more creative, and thriving?

All of this, of course, is just another way to bring out the importance of improved measurement for improving network quality and community life. As Surowiecki put it in The Wisdom of Crowds, the SARS virus was sequenced in a matter of weeks by a network of labs sharing common technical standards; without those standards, it would have taken any one of them weeks to do the same job alone. The messages these labs sent back and forth had an elevated stickiness index because they were more transparently and efficiently codified than messages were back in the days before the technical standards were created.

So the question emerges, given the means to create common languages with enhanced stickiness properties, such as we have in advanced measurement models, what kinds of creativity and innovation can we expect when these languages are introduced in the domains of human, social, and natural capital markets? That is the question of the age, it seems to me…

Gladwell, M. (2000). The tipping point: How little things can make a big difference. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.

Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Surowiecki, J. (2004). The wisdom of crowds: Why the many are smarter than the few and how collective wisdom shapes business, economies, societies and nations. New York: Doubleday.

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LivingCapitalMetrics Blog by William P. Fisher, Jr., Ph.D. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Based on a work at livingcapitalmetrics.wordpress.com.
Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://www.livingcapitalmetrics.com.